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I. INTRODUCTION
ANTITRUST cases, like other cases, should be decided on the ba-
sis of law and facts. Economic theory, which has always had a
prominent role in antitrust analysis,' should serve to inform the
*Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.B.A. 1965, J.D. 1967,
University of Iowa; L.L.M. (Taxation) 1969, Georgetown University.
1. In one of its earliest decisions holding that a combination to raise prices restrained
trade in violation of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court relied on a basic principle of
1835
SMU LAW REVIEW
law and illuminate facts. Often it has done so. For example, in White
Motor Co. v. United States2 the Supreme Court declined to adopt a rule
of per se illegality for vertical territorial restraints, observing that, "We do
not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these
arrangements emerge to be certain" about their purpose or effect on
competition.3 A legal doctrine urged by the government was rejected be-
cause the Court lacked a sufficiently persuasive economic theory to make
an informed decision. And, when the Court held that a combination of
the second and third largest banks in Philadelphia would probably injure
competition in violation of the Clayton Act,4 the Court relied on an eco-
nomic theory in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence. The struc-
ture-conduct-performance paradigm5 holds that industry structure
influences firm conduct, which in turn influences how well an industry
-performs in meeting the needs of consumers. This theory led the Court
to conclude that the evidence of probable competitive injury was
persuasive.6
In some cases the Court has ignored economic theory or has relegated
it to an insignificant role, and the Court has come to regret it. A good
example is provided by United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.7 where
territorial and customer restraints imposed by a manufacturer on its dis-
tributors were held per se unlawful under the Sherman Act. Despite its
distaste for overruling prior decisions, ten years later in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,8 the Court acknowledged its error and over-
ruled Schwinn, noting that "[e]conomists have identified a number of
ways in which manufacturers can use such restrictions to compete more
price theory: the demand for a product varies inversely with its price. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The Court stated: "The parties to such a
combination might realize more profit by the higher prices they would secure than they
could earn by doing more work at a much less price .... [1]f [the] effect be to destroy
competition and thus advance the price, the combination is one in restraint of trade." Id.
at 245.
2. 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (defendant truck manufacturer imposed restraints on where
and to whom its dealers could sell).
3. Id. at 263.
4. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
5. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 42 (1994) (providing a
brief but informative discussion of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm).
6. The Court stated:
[W]e think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in
the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive
effects. Such a test ...is fully consonant with economic theory. That
"[clompetition is likely to be greatest when there are many sellers, none of
which has any significant market share," is common ground among most
economists, and was undoubtedly a premise of congressional reasoning about
the antimerger statute.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363 (citations omitted).
7. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
8. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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effectively against other manufacturers." 9 Antitrust analysis, the Court
concluded, "must be based on demonstrable economic effect rather
than-as in Schwinn-upon formalistic line drawing."' 10 Since Sylvania,
economic analysis has had an increasingly important but undefined role
in antitrust decisions. As has been observed, "economic theory can be a
tool of factual analysis or it can be a type of formalistic, doctrinal con-
straint on relevant factual inquiry."" Striking the appropriate balance
between the use of economic theory as a tool of analysis on the one hand,
and its enshrinement as legal doctrine on the other is not always easy.
According to the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,12 antitrust juries are
"presumed to know and understand the law, the facts of the case, and the
realities of the market.' 3 Relying on its earlier decision in Eastman Ko-
dak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,' 4 the Court also announced that
when the realities of the market and record facts indicate a violation has
occurred, economic "theory will not stand in the way of liability."' 5 The
meaning of these statements, and, more generally, the role of economic
theory in deciding antitrust cases will be explored below. The article
demonstrates that economic theory has sometimes become an independ-
ent force in the decision making process. As an independent force, eco-
nomic theory has neither served merely to aid the courts in formulating
appropriate rules of law nor merely to assist the factfinder in drawing
inferences from basic facts. Rather, economic theory has functioned as a
rule of law that may be invoked by the courts to usurp the traditional
fact-finding role of the jury. In short, economic theory sometimes has
been used to trump record facts in determining whether the antitrust laws
have been violated.
The article begins with a consideration of the court of appeals decision
in Brooke as an example of how economic theory sometimes serves this
doctrinal function. The Supreme Court repudiated the court of appeals'
analysis, noting that it "[did] not contain the traditional apparatus of fact
review; rather, it focuse[d] on theoretical and legal arguments."'1 6 None-
theless, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. The
article contrasts the "traditional apparatus of fact review" presumably un-
dertaken by the Supreme Court, with the process of review undertaken
by the courts of appeals and criticized by the Supreme Court. It con-
cludes that, despite protestations to the contrary, the Supreme Court, like
9. Id. at 54-55.
10. Id. at 59.
11. Peter C. Carstensen, Predatory Pricing in the Courts: Reflection on Tw'o Decisions,
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 928, 943 (1986).
12. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993). Due to an acquisition, the petitioner's name was changed
from Liggett Group to Brooke Group while the case was pending. Id. at 2582. As in the
Court's opinion, Brooke Group will be referred to as Liggett.
13. 113 S. Ct. at 2598.
14. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).




the court of appeals, permits economic theory to assume a doctrinal role
and to inappropriately limit factual inquiry.
Next, the article examines the Kodak case in which the Court rejected
the defendant's argument that the defendant was entitled to summary
judgment because economic theory precluded a finding of competitive
injury. Rather, the Court said, "we must unravel the factual assumptions
underlying [the economic theory],"'17 to determine whether the theory fits
the case at hand. Thus, in sharp contrast to Brooke, Kodak subordinated
economic theory to factual analysis. Economic theory was assigned a
prominent role, but did not control the determination of liability. The
article concludes by assessing the implications of Brooke and Kodak for
the future role of economic theory in antitrust analysis.
II. BROOKE GROUP LTD. v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON
TOBACCO CORP.
A. THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC THEORIES
The case was brought under the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination
Act by Liggett. i8 As a matter of legal theory, it was a rather simple case.
The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination where the effect
may be substantially to lessen competition.19 Generally, price discrimina-
tion simply means charging different prices for similar products sold to
different customers at about the same time; or, as put by the Supreme
Court, a price discrimination "is merely a price difference. 20
For the plaintiff to prevail, competitive injury must be found in the
market where the discriminating firm sells (the seller's market), or in the
market where the favored customer sells (the buyer's market). Since the
Act prohibits price discrimination where the effect may be substantially
to lessen competition, actual diminution of competition is not required.
"Competitive injury" in the antitrust context includes probable as well as
actual injury. In a primary line case the focus is on the seller's market,
while in a secondary line case the focus is on the buyer's market. Liggett
made only a primary line claim. Essentially, Liggett argued that competi-
tion in the sale of cigarettes by manufacturers could be diminished by
Brown & Williamson's discriminatory pricing with predatory intent; that
is, an intent to use discriminatory pricing as a weapon to force an increase
in the price of Liggett's cigarettes, and thus an increase in the price of
cigarettes generally. The only issue on appeal was whether discrimina-
tory pricing by Brown & Williamson properly could be viewed as serving
17. 112 S. Ct. at 2083.
18. See supra note 12.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1988). The Act also prohibits price discrimination which injures
competition with the customers of the person who grants a discriminatory price; however,
Brooke did not involve a claim of so-called secondary line injury.
20. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960).
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a predatory purpose and could, therefore, support a finding of injury to
competition.21
This legal theory of competitive injury is based on an economic theory
that predates the antitrust laws. Essentially, the economic theory holds
that temporarily lowering prices below a profit maximizing level may
serve the interests of a firm where the effect is to eliminate or discipline a
competitor, thereafter enabling the firm to raise its price above the preex-
isting level. In short, the predatory firm. intentionally forgoes current
profits in a competitive market, in order to earn larger future profits in a
less competitive market. The expectation is that future profits will more
than offset (or recoup) past losses. Profits, therefore, can be maximized
in the long-run by reducing prices and profits in the short-run.
Predatory prices may be made available to all customers, in which case
they are not discriminatory and cannot be challenged under the Robin-
son-Patman Act. Of course, the greater the availability of predatory
prices, the greater will be their cost to the predator. Thus, the predator is
likely to target low prices in ways that minimize harm to itself without
diminishing harm to its prey. For example, a firm selling nationally and
facing particularly aggressive price competition in a local market might
reduce its price only in the local market. The lower price in the local
market is discriminatory when compared to prices charged elsewhere.
The allegedly unlawful prices in Brooke were similarly discriminatory.
Although not based on territory, the price cuts were implemented
through promotional discounts not offered on a uniform basis to all
customers.
Predatory pricing, whether or not discriminatory, is one form of preda-
tory conduct that may be challenged as monopolization violative of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. Since section 2 can be violated only if
monopolization has occurred or is probable, and the Robinson-Patman
Act has no such requirement;22 conduct subject to both provisions nor-
mally will be evaluated only under the more strict Robinson-Patman Act.
That was the case in Brooke.
Tension between record facts and economic theory is particularly in-
tense in predatory pricing cases. This is because the economic theory of
predatory pricing outlined above is intuitively appealing to many people,
21. The law clearly allows an inference of competitive injury from discriminatory pric-
ing with predatory intent. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967). Exactly what evidence will support an inference of predatory intent, however, is
less than clear. The jury found competitive injury and entered a $49.6 million verdict in
favor of Liggett. The district court granted Brown & Williamson's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
748 F. Supp. 344, 348 (M.D.N.C. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and
the Supreme Court affirmed. 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
22. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination "where the effect ...
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1988). The Sherman Act declares that it is unlawful to monopolize or attempt to
monopolize trade or commerce among the states. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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particularly people with a populist bent;23 but is highly suspect among
economists, particularly economists of the Chicago School.24 Because the
cost to the predator is heavy and the benefits are uncertain, many, but not
all,25 economic theorists claim that predatory pricing is almost always ir-
rational and hardly ever occurs. When a jury finds that predatory pricing
has occurred, the court must determine whether to uphold the facts as
found by the jury, or to set them aside as not supported by the evidence
and enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. A judgment entered
on the verdict may be appealed, and the appellate court must then deter-
mine whether the finding should be overturned as unreasonable or
clearly erroneous. At either the trial or appellate level, the determination
can be heavily influenced by the judge's notion of what economic theory
suggests concerning the likelihood of predatory pricing. If the judge sub-
23. John McGee opened his groundbreaking article on predatory pricing by Standard
Oil with a quote from Ida Tarbell: "He [Rockefeller] applied underselling for destroying
his rivals' markets with the same deliberation and persistency that characterized all his
efforts, and in the long run he always won." John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137 (1958). The article undertakes a detailed
examination of the record in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (Stan-
dard Oil), and concludes that Standard Oil did not use predatory pricing to drive out com-
peting refiners. To have done so would have been foolish since it was less costly to buy out
competitors than to force them out through predatory pricing. McGee's article is the gene-
sis of an economic view holding that predatory pricing is usually irrational and seldom
occurs, and of the notion that courts should be wary of jury findings of predatory pricing.
This is surprising since, whatever the legend, there was no finding of predatory pricing in
Standard Oil. The government alleged discriminatory pricing, but the trial court made no
finding on the issue, and the Supreme Court merely recited the allegation without discus-
sion. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 173 F. 177, 190, 192 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1909),
aff'd, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 70-77. McGee may have had much to
say concerning the conclusions of Ms. Tarbell (and the legislative history of the Clayton
Act that reflects a similar populist bent), but had nothing to say concerning the validity of
the findings of fact in Standard Oil. Nevertheless, McGee's work has been a wellspring of
proposals to reduce or eliminate legal restraints on predatory pricing because they involve
"a high probability of mistake, and hence of harassment, by enforcement authorities and
private plaintiffs." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRusT PARADOX 154 (1978).
24. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 23, at 148-155; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); McGee, supra note 23. The Chicago School of anti-
trust analysis originated with economic and legal theorists at the University of Chicago. It
views "antitrust policy through the lens of price theory." Richard A. Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979). Price theory assumes that
firms are rational profit maximizers, the demand for a product varies inversely with its
price, and the market allocates resources to their most highly prized uses. Others, some-
times referred to as structuralists, or as advocates of the Harvard School, agree that these
are powerful principles, but claim that they do not explain all market behavior. Market
structure, or the number of firms in a market and the allocation of market shares among
them, also has a powerful influence on firm behavior. For an explanation of the competing
views and an argument that they have tended to converge, see id. For a counterargument
see Richard R. Nelson, Comments on a Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1979).
25. Cf McGee, supra note 23, BORK, supra note 23, and Easterbrook, supra note 24,
with Harry S. Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39
Sw. L.J. 755, 757 (1985); Richard S. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply
to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41, 83-85 (1984); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert
D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product hInovation, 91 YALE
L.J. 8 (1981). Even Richard Posner, a powerful advocate of Chicago School economics,
has stated that the Chicago School has gone too far in proclaiming the implausibility of
predatory pricing. See Posner, supra note 24, at 939-40.
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scribes to the Chicago School theory that predatory pricing is almost al-
ways irrational and hardly ever occurs, it becomes very difficult to uphold
the finding, regardless of the evidence.2 6
B. THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
The American cigarette industry has long been highly concentrated and
highly profitable.2 7 Six firms account for most production, and two of the
six (i.e., R.J. Reynolds and Phillip Morris) had sixty-eight percent of the
market at the time of trial. Defendant Brown & Williamson ranked third
with twelve percent. For many years there was no significant price com-
petition in the sale of cigarettes. List prices increased in lock-step twice a
year, regardless of the rate of inflation, the cost of production, or shifts in
consumer demand. Nonetheless, by 1980 a decline in consumer demand
triggered by health concerns and non-price competition had taken their
toll on Liggett. Liggett's market share had declined from twenty percent
to two percent, and it was on the verge of failure.
In an effort to revitalize lagging sales, Liggett pioneered the develop-
ment of generic cigarettes priced at approximately thirty percent below
branded cigarettes. Not surprisingly, price competition worked. By 1984,
when Brown & Williamson entered the generic segment of the market,
Liggett had doubled its market share, going from two percent in 1980 to
four percent in 1984. Throughout that period, Liggett dominated the ge-
neric segment with about a ninety-seven percent share.28 Brown & Wil-
liamson's generic was especially threatening to Liggett since it had black
and white packaging similar to Liggett's, and was offered at a lower price.
Liggett responded to this threat by cutting the price of its generic
brand, and a price war ensued. At the end of each round of price cuts,
Brown & Williamson maintained a price advantage over Liggett.
Although Brown & Williamson's generic price was above cost at the out-
set, Liggett claimed that as the battle progressed Brown & Williamson cut
prices below cost.2 9 In June 1985, Liggett raised its price, and Brown &
Williamson matched the price increase in October of that year.
In the summer of 1986, a pattern of semi-annual price increases for
generic cigarettes was established which corresponded to the industry
pricing pattern for branded cigarettes. By the time of trial in 1989, the
price gap between black and white generics and branded cigarettes had
26. In overturning a jury finding of predatory pricing, the Brooke Court quoted from
its earlier decision in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986), as follows: "predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely suc-
cessful." Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2589 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589). Matsushita relied
on writings of Chicago School economists. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-90.
27. The facts described in this section were presented in the Court's opinion as "cen-
tral, historical facts" on which the parties agreed. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2582.
28. Prior to Brown & Williamson's entry into the generic cigarette segment of the
market, R.J. Reynolds had made its entry by reducing the price of its Doral brand to Lig-
gett's generic price level.




diminished from approximately thirty-eight percent to twenty-seven per-
cent. Five cigarette manufacturers, however, including Liggett, had intro-
duced so-called "subgenerics," at a price about fifty percent below that of
branded cigarettes.
C. THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
The only issue on appeal was whether Brown & Williamson had en-
gaged in predatory pricing. If so, the jury finding of probable injury to
competition would be upheld, and a violation established. Brown & Wil-
liamson's twelve percent market share was far short of that required for
monopoly. Thus, Liggett did not fashion its claim according to the classic
predatory pricing theory under which a firm reduces its price to eliminate
competitors and achieve power to unilaterally raise prices in the future.
Rather, it argued that Brown & Williamson priced generic cigarettes be-
low cost intending to discipline Liggett for using price competition to in-
duce consumers to switch from branded to generic cigarettes. By
disciplining Liggett, it was alleged, Brown & Williamson hoped to in-
crease the price for generic cigarettes through oligopolistic pricing. That
is, major producers would price generics cooperatively with Brown &
Williamson to avoid eroding their sales of branded cigarettes, and small
producers like Liggett would price cooperatively to avoid a costly price
war. This would narrow the price gap between generic and branded ciga-
rettes and preserve Brown & Williamson's highly profitable sales of
branded cigarettes. 30
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
Relying on Utah Pie,31 the court of appeals recognized that competitive
injury under the Robinson-Patman Act may be inferred from predatory
pricing. 32 Although it characterized the line between legitimate competi-
tive pricing and predatory pricing as "murky," it concluded on the basis
of Matsushita,33 and other post-Utah Pie decisions that for pricing to be
characterized as predatory it must: (1) be below some appropriate mea-
sure of cost, and (2) occur with the "rational expectation of later realizing
monopoly profits."'34 The court of appeals held that Liggett failed to es-
tablish the second element.
Brown & Williamson had only twelve percent of the market and any
expectation of monopoly profits depended on the probable reaction of
other producers to its price cuts. Liggett argued that producers with a
substantial share of the branded cigarette market would have little incen-
tive to develop the generic market because generics were less profitable
30. Id. at 2584.
31. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
32. Liggett Group, 964 F.2d at 338-39.
33. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
34. Liggett Group, 964 F.2d at 339. The Supreme Court adopted essentially the same
requirements and they are discussed below. See infra text following note 59.
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than branded cigarettes. It was, therefore, unlikely that if Liggett exited
the market or raised its price, another producer would take its place as an
aggressive price competitor in the generic market. The court countered,
however, that Brown & Williamson may have been perceived by other
producers as simply intending to substitute itself for Liggett as the leading
producer of generics. Absent an agreement among Brown & Williamson
and the other producers (none was alleged), there was little likelihood
the other producers would refrain from competing vigorously in the ge-
neric market. Without such cooperation, the Court noted, there was little
likelihood Brown & Williamson could raise the price of generics and nar-
row the price gap between generic and branded cigarettes.
E. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
Central to the court of appeals decision was the requirement that the
defendant have a rational expectation of recouping losses due to pricing
below cost by raising prices to supracompetitive levels. This requirement
could not be met, the court held, by an expectation that prices could be
raised through cooperative or oligopolistic pricing as urged by Liggett,
since such an expectation would be "economically irrational. ' '35 The
court found support for this holding in Matsushita noting that there the
Supreme Court held that a conspiracy to reduce prices with no hope of
recoupment was "economically senseless, [and] did not violate the anti-
trust laws."' 36 In fact, Matsushita involved no such holding. Even if it
had, such a holding would not address the question whether a rational
expectation of recoupment could be based on an expectation of oligo-
polistic pricing. 37 The error is instructive because it demonstrates how
easily antitrust analysis can slip from the proper to the improper use of
economic theory.
In Matsushita Zenith Radio Corporation claimed that some twenty Jap-
anese manufacturers of television sets had conspired to fix artificially
high prices in Japan and artificially low prices in the United States. The
Supreme Court noted that firms would be unlikely to depress prices by
agreement unless they expected to recoup their losses by raising prices in
later years. Since the evidence indicated little or no likelihood of the
alleged conspirators achieving power over price, the Court concluded
that the alleged conspiracy was not supported by a rational motive, and
35. Liggett Group, 964 F.2d at 342.
36. Id. at 339.
37. Such a holding would have supported a recoupment requirement under the Robin-
son-Patman Act. If a low price conspiracy with no hope of recoupment cannot violate the
Sherman Act because it cannot harm consumers, a discriminatory low price charged by a
single firm with no prospect of recoupment should not violate the Robinson-Patman Act,
even if undertaken for the purpose of disciplining a competitor. In the former case, a con-
spiracy to fix low prices would be harmless because recoupment is impossible. Similarly, in
the latter case the bad purpose would be harmless since recoupment is impossible. This, of
course, says nothing about the possibility of losses being recouped through means other
than achieving monopoly power, such as oligopolistic pricing.
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was "economically senseless. '38 Therefore, the Court held, to survive a
motion for dismissal the plaintiff must submit evidence which tends to
exclude independent action. If a low price conspiracy were found despite
this elevated evidentiary standard, the Supreme Court would presumably
uphold a violation. Otherwise, there would have been no need to remand
the case. 39
The Matsushita Court used economic theory to shed light on the likeli-
hood of conspiracy. Because economic theory suggested that the alleged
conspiracy was unlikely, the Court adopted an elevated evidentiary stan-
dard. While one may disagree with the Court's conclusion concerning
38. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597-98. Justice White, dissenting, observed: "The Court
•.. assumes that petitioners valued profit-maximization over growth .... I believe that this
is an assumption that should be argued to the factfinder, not decided by the Court." Id. at
604. For an argument that Justice White was correct, and the factfinder would be likely to
reject the majority's view because "Japanese firms, with their commitment to lifetime em-
ployment, were more interested in maintaining or increasing sales to sustain growth than in
maximizing profits," see David F. Shores, Narrowing the Sherman Act Through An Exten-
sion of Colgate: The Matsushita Case, 55 TENN. L. REv. 261, 284 (1988). It is well known
that Japanese firms do not subscribe to price theory in precisely the same way as do Chi-
cago School economists on which the Court relied. See James Fallows, What Is an Econ-
omy For? ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1994 at 76, 78, (drawn from a book by the same
author, LOOKING AT THE SUN: THE RISE OF THE NEW EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC & POLIT-
ICAL SYSTEM (1994)):
Anglo-American economic theory can explain why Japanese prices are so
high: the retail system is full of cartels and monopolies. A network of laws,
contracts, and commercial agreements in Japan discourages discounting and
price competition. Until it was relaxed in the early 1990s, Japan's famous dai
ten ho, or "big store law," effectively outlawed supermarkets, since it re-
quired that small local merchants give their approval (or be bribed into doing
so) before a big store could be built. It is hard for familiar economic theory
to accept that such an inefficient and anti-consumer system might last for
many decades, with the apparent approval even of the victimized population
of consumers.
The immediate reason the system lasts is the political power of small
merchants, who-along with farmers and the construction industries-are
big donors to the powerful Liberal Democratic Party in Japan. The more
basic reason it lasts is that it helps producers, and in ways that offset the
penalty to consumers. When competition in Europe or America pushes
down the price of VCRs, cars, and semi-conductor chips, Japanese producers
can.., wring monopoly profits out of their own people in order to build a
war chest for competition overseas.
39. Concerning reconsideration on remand the Supreme Court stated:
On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to consider whether there is other
evidence that is sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find that
petitioners conspired to price predatorily for two decades despite the ab-
sence of any apparent motive to do so. The evidence must 'ten[d] to exclude
the possibility' that petitioners underpriced respondents to compete for busi-
ness rather than to implement an economically senseless conspiracy.
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597-98 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 764 (1984)). If the evidence in fact supported an economically senseless low-price
conspiracy, and such a conspiracy were found to exist, the Court apparently assumed it
would be an unlawful conspiracy.
Although the court of appeals in Brooke misread Matsushita in concluding that it re-
quires a reasonable prospect of recoupment in order for a low-price conspiracy to be un-
lawful, it was correct in viewing Matsushita as generally supporting a recoupment
requirement for single firm predatory pricing under the Sherman Act. In any event, the
Supreme Court adopted such a requirement in Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2587-88.
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what economic theory suggested,40 its method of analysis was appropri-
ate. Economic theory was used as an analytical tool to illuminate facts,
such as the likelihood of a conspiracy, and to inform the law, by deter-
mining that an elevated evidentiary standard applies to determine
whether an economically implausible conspiracy existed.
The court of appeals in Brooke, on the other hand, used economic the-
ory to trump the evidence. By requiring a rational expectation of recoup-
ment to characterize discriminatory pricing as predatory, and, therefore,
as unlawful; and then by using economic theory to conclude that any ex-
pectation of recoupment by a firm with a twelve percent market share
was irrational, the court effectively took from the jury the question
whether the defendant in fact rationally expected to recoup losses flowing
from its discriminatory pricing. Put another way, Matsushita increased
the burden of proof on a plaintiff who relied on an economically implau-
sible theory of conspiracy; on the other hand, the court of appeals deci-
sion in Brooke denied the plaintiff any opportunity to prove an
economically implausible theory of recoupment, regardless of the evi-
dence. Economic theory, therefore, was an absolute obstacle to Liggett's
recovery.
Properly applied, Matsushita at most supports the use of economic the-
ory to characterize a legal theory as implausible. 41 Once a legal theory is
so characterized, Matsushita imposes an unusually heavy evidentiary bur-
den on the plaintiff. It does not suggest that the plaintiff is automatically
out of court. As applied to Liggett's claim that Brown & Williamson had
engaged in predatory pricing, Matsushita properly might be taken to im-
pose an extraordinary evidentiary burden on Liggett, because recoup-
ment by Brown & Williamson would be economically implausible in light
of its small market share. The decision cannot properly be taken, as it
was by the court of appeals, to preclude the claim regardless of the
evidence.
F. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' holding that as a
matter of law Liggett could not prove the likelihood of recoupment
40. See supra note 38.
41. At issue in Matsushita was the standard district courts must apply when deciding
whether to grant summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. Query whether the
Court's rationale should be limited to conspiracy issues. Although Matsushita has often
been cited in cases not involving conspiracy issues, see, e.g., Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d
793, 801 (2d Cir. 1994), its elevated evidentiary standard has not been pervasively applied.
See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906
F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 959 (1991). Nonetheless, as the Brooke
opinion demonstrates, Matsushita has generally made it more difficult for antitrust plain-
tiffs to resist a motion to dismiss, especially in predatory pricing cases. Brooke, 113 S. Ct.
at 2592. Furthermore, Matsushita generally supports a recoupment requirement for single
firm predatory pricing violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act, see supra note 39, a require-
ment that was adopted in Brooke. See infra text accompanying note 47.
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through uniform or oligopolistic pricing in a highly concentrated market.
The Court stated:
A predatory pricing scheme designed to preserve or create a stable
oligopoly, if successful, can injure consumers in the same way, and to
the same extent, as one designed to bring about a monopoly. How-
ever unlikely that possibility may be as a general matter, when the
realities of the market and the record facts indicate that it has oc-
curred and was likely to have succeeded, theory will not stand in the
way of liability.42
The Supreme Court had no choice in the matter if it was to pay even
token respect to applicable statutory law. Under the court of appeals'
approach, a firm with no prospect of achieving a monopoly could not
violate the Robinson-Patman Act on a primary line theory through dis-
criminatory below-cost pricing. This is so because a rational expectation
of recoupment was held essential to a violation, and there could be no
rational expectation of recoupment by a firm with no prospect for achiev-
ing monopoly power. On the other hand, if a firm had a prospect of
achieving a monopoly, the firm would violate both the Robinson-Patman
Act and the monopolization provisions of the Sherman Act.4 3 Therefore,
so far as primary line injury, or competitive injury in the seller's market is
concerned, the Robinson-Patman Act would be a dead letter, adding
nothing to the Sherman Act. Whatever one's views concerning the wis-
dom of the Robinson-Patman Act, as the Supreme Court observed, "For
all the words of the Act to carry adequate meaning, competitive injury
under the Act must extend beyond the monopoly setting. '44
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that
under Matsushita two conditions must be met to establish a predatory
pricing claim under either the Robinson-Patman Act or the Sherman
Act.45 First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant priced below
42. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2591.
43. Section 2 makes it unlawful to monopolize or attempt to monopolize. 15 U.S.C.§ 2 (1988). Attempted monopolization has two elements: (1) a specific intent to monopo-
lize, usually established by evidence of predatory conduct such as predatory pricing; and
(2) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly, usually shown by evidence of market
share. See Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); LAWRENCE A. SULLI-
VAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANrirmusT 134 (1977). Predatory conduct is often rec-
ognized as a separate (third) element. See Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 926(4th Cir. 1990); HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 250-51. However, it seems logical to view
predatory conduct as the means by which the intent element is proved. Pricing below cost
with a reasonable expectation of recoupment as delineated in the court of appeals' Brooke
decision would satisfy both elements since it necessarily involves both an intent to monop-
olize, that is, to achieve supracompetitive pricing through the unilateral or joint exercise of
power over price, and a reasonable prospect of doing so. In Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. Mc-Quillan, 113 S. Ct. 884 (1993) the Court held that "demonstrating the dangerous
probability of monopolization in an attempt case ... requires inquiry into the relevant
product and geographic market and the defendant's economic power in that market." Id
at 892.
44. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2591.
45. kd at 2587-88.
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cost.46 Second, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a rea-
sonable prospect in a Robinson-Patman Act case, or a dangerous
probability in a Sherman Act case, of recouping losses attributable to be-
low-cost pricing.47
Although the Supreme Court rejected the notion that recoupment was
impossible as a matter of law merely because Brown & Williamson had
no prospect of achieving monopoly power, it agreed that the evidence on
recoupment was not sufficient to submit to the jury. "No inference of
recoupment is sustainable on this record," the Court stated, "because no
evidence suggests that Brown & Williamson - whatever its intent in intro-
ducing black and whites may have been - was likely to obtain the power
to raise the prices for generic cigarettes above a competitive level."' 48 A
reasonable prospect for recoupment could have been established, the
Court noted, either by evidence of actual recoupment or by a showing
that recoupment was probable. 49
On the issue of actual recoupment, the Court found the evidence inad-
equate in several respects.50 Liggett relied primarily on evidence of list
prices that, the Court concluded, were essentially meaningless because of
promotional schemes such as coupons, stickers, and give-a-ways that re-
duced the actual price below the list price. Furthermore, Liggett's evi-
dence of a narrowing of the price gap between generic and branded
cigarettes ignored the effect of subgenerics. With subgenerics taken into
account, the price gap between branded cigarettes and generics (includ-
ing subgenerics) increased rather than diminished following the period of
predation. Finally, the Court concluded that "an inference of supracom-
petitive pricing would be particularly anomalous... [because] Liggett's
own officers and directors consistently denied that they or other firms in
the industry priced their cigarettes through tacit collusion or reaped
supracompetitive profits." 51 Since Liggett denied having been effectively
disciplined and having raised its prices in response to Brown & William-
son's below-cost pricing, it could not simultaneously claim that Brown &
Williamson had a reasonable expectation that it would do the opposite.
As for probable recoupment, the Court again found the evidence want-
ing. Since there was no allegation Brown & Williamson conspired with
other cigarette producers, it would have had to rely on tacit price coordi-
46. As in Matsushita, see 475 U.S. at 585 n.8, the Court side-stepped the question of
how cost is to be measured for purposes of determining whether the defendant priced
below cost. See Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2587 n.1. The lower courts are not in agreement on
this issue. Cf. Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1056-57
(6th Cir.) (marginal or average variable cost), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984) with Tans-
america Computer Co., Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th
Cir.) (average total cost), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983).
47. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2588. The Court did not explain what, if any, difference exists
between the "reasonable prospect" and "dangerous probability" standards.
48. Id. at 2592.
49. Id. at 2588.
50. Id. at 2593-95.
51. ld. at 2595.
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nation to increase the price of generics and recoup its losses. Although
the Court recognized that the cigarette industry had long been character-
ized by such oligopolistic or interdependent pricing,52 it nevertheless con-
cluded that while in some cases interdependent pricing could provide a
basis for inferring a reasonable expectation of recoupment following a
period of below-cost pricing, no such expectation could exist in the ciga-
rette market of the 1980s for several reasons. 53
First, the introduction of generic cigarettes in 1980 introduced price
competition into the market for the first time since 1930. Second, for
interdependent pricing to occur it is important that prices be readily iden-
tifiable. The extensive use of promotional discounts, coupons and rebates
made it difficult to determine actual, as opposed to list, prices. Third,
increasing the price of generics through interdependent pricing depended
upon the recognition by all firms that it was in their interest to do so. Yet,
in 1984, R.J. Reynolds reduced the price of Doral to generic levels with
the apparent purpose of expanding sales at the expense of other firms
and regaining its number one position in the industry.
Fourth, even if other producers recognized that it was in their interest
to increase the price of generic cigarettes, for Brown & Williamson to
accomplish that goal it would have had to signal to the other firms that its
purpose in pricing below cost was not simply to expand sales at their ex-
pense, but to discipline Liggett and ultimately raise the price of generics.
Liggett argued that Brown & Williamson sent such a signal by maintain-
ing list prices while offering substantial discounts to wholesalers. "But,"
said the Court, "a reasonable jury could not conclude that this pricing
structure eliminated or rendered insignificant the risk that the other firms
might misunderstand Brown & Williamson's entry as a competitive
move."
54
Finally, the Court observed that although Brown & Williamson's cor-
porate documents evidenced a desire to restrict the growth of generic
cigarettes,55 and the record evidence was sufficient to support the infer-
ence that Brown & Williamson intended to do so, 56 "no objective evi-
dence of its conduct permits a reasonable inference that it had any real
prospect of doing so through anticompetitive means.
57
52. Id at 2583. Under oligopoly pricing theory, firms in a market with few sellers have
little incentive to compete on price. Each firm prices its product with a view to how other
firms will react. If one firm lowers its price in an attempt to increase sales at the expense of
other firms, the other firms are likely to react by adopting similar price reductions. The net
result is that the first firm to cut its price gains no price advantage over its competitors and
succeeds only in lowering the price for all firms to a less profitable level. Similarly, if a firm
increases its price, competitors must decide whether to follow or hold the line. If they hold
the line because they fear that a reduction in demand could offset the benefits of the higher
price, or for other reasons, the first firm will be forced to roll back its price increase.
53. Id. at 2595-97.
54. Id. at 2597.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2592.
57. Id. at 2597.
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Since Brown & Williamson's below-cost pricing did not actually lead to
recoupment through reduced output and higher prices in the generic ciga-
rette market, and had no reasonable prospect of doing so, it "could not
inflict the injury to competition the antitrust laws prohibit. '5 8
G. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Brooke Court set out for the first time the conditions that must be
met for pricing to be characterized as predatory. It is now clear that for
purposes of either the Robinson-Patman Act or the Sherman Act, preda-
tory pricing must be below an appropriate measure of cost,59 and must be
undertaken with a reasonable prospect of recoupment.
1. Pricing Below Cost
Pricing below cost was held relevant to the determination of whether
price cuts were predatory in Utah Pie,6° and a groundbreaking article by
Professors Thrner and Areeda led most,6 1 but not all,62 courts to adopt a
cost-based test for predatory pricing. They argued that to minimize the
risk of legitimate price competition being falsely characterized as preda-
tory, prices above average variable cost should be per se lawful.63 Some
courts, while recognizing the significance of price-cost evidence to the
predation issue, refused to treat above-cost prices as per se lawful, opting
instead for a rebuttable presumption of legality. 64 The Supreme Court's
rejection of this open-ended approach seems appropriate. As Judge
Hand cautioned, "The successful competitor, having been urged to com-
pete, must not be turned upon when he wins."'65 While it is undoubtedly
true that in some cases prices above cost may be fairly characterized as
predatory, 66 the harm to consumers of allowing an occasional predator to
go unpunished is less than the potential harm of a rule that might perva-
58. Id. at 2598.
59. The Court did not indicate how cost should be measured. See supra note 46.
60. 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
61. See, e.g., Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d
582, 596 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Double H Plastics, Inc. v. So-
noco Prods. Co., 732 F.2d 351, 354 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900 (1984); D.E. Rogers
Assocs., Inc. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1439 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1242 (1984).
62. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITI Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d
1014 (9th Cir. 1981) (pricing below cost relevant but not essential to predatory pricing),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
63. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697, 716-18 (1975).
64. Transamerica Computer, 698 F.2d at 1386 (quoting Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1035-36)
(prices below cost presumptively predatory and prices above cost presumptively
nonpredatory).
65. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
66. See F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV.
L. REv. 869, 890 (1976) (exclusionary price strategies may harm competition without low-
ering price below cost); Lawrence A. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disci-
plines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214, 1229-30,
1232 (1977) (documentary or other evidence of "human animus" should be controlling);
Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J.
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sively deter aggressive price competition. Just as a rule of per se illegality
may be justified on the basis of "economic prediction, judicial conven-
ience, and business certainty, ' 67 so may a rule of per se legality. As the
Brooke Court stated, so long as a price is above cost it either "represents
competition on the merits, or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial
tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate
price-cutting."68
2. Recoupment
The Court's treatment of recoupment is another matter. In a Sherman
Act, section 2 case, the traditional requirements for establishing a viola-
tion are an intent to monopolize, and either the possession of monopoly
power or a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.69 The
intent element is typically established through evidence of predatory con-
duct, such as predatory pricing.70 The power element is typically estab-
lished through evidence of market share.71 If market share analysis
shows that a firm possesses, or is close to possessing, monopoly power, it
either has, or is close to having, power over price. Therefore, a dangerous
probability of recouping losses due to below-cost pricing will exist when-
ever the power element is satisfied. In other words, evidence that tradi-
tionally has been required to satisfy the power element of a section 2 case
will automatically satisfy the recoupment requirement in a section 2 pred-
atory pricing case. Thus, the Brooke holding that the intent element of a
284 (1977) (the level of output is a more important factor in characterizing price than is its
relationship to cost).
67. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982).
68. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2588.
69. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966); Walker Process
Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174-78 (1965); Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); see also supra note 43.
70. Taking business from a competitor through legitimate competitive behavior is not
predatory, even if it leads to monopoly. As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, "the intent relevant to a § 2 Sherman Act claim is only the intent to maintain or
achieve monopoly power by anticompetitive means. Section 2 forbids not the intentional
pursuit of monopoly power but the employment of unjustifiable means to obtain that
power." Illinois ex rel. Burnis v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481 (7th Cir.
1991) (emphasis in the original), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992). Prior to the Court's
decision in Brooke most lower court decisions focused on the relationship of price to cost
in characterizing pricing as predatory or competitive. See Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Brown-
ing-Ferris Indus., Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Inglis,
668 F.2d 1014, 1034; International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,
723-25 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). Some decisions also considered
subjective intent. See McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487, 1500 (11th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989). Some courts considered the possibility of
recoupment. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990); Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334,
1341-47 (8th Cir. 1987). A.A. Poultry Farms and Henry are discussed below. See infra text
accompanying notes 74-77.
71. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, 113 S. Ct. at 884,891-92; United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389-96, 404 (1956); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 826-
28 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985); Woods Exploration & Producing Co.
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286, 1304-08 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047
(1972).
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section 2 case can be inferred from evidence of below-cost pricing only if
there is a dangerous probability of recoupment adds nothing to the tradi-
tional requirements for establishing a section 2 violation.
The question arises whether the same, or a similar,72 recoupment re-
quirement should exist under the Robinson-Patman Act. Utah Pie made
no mention of recoupment. Furthermore, in contrast to section 2 of the
Sherman Act, neither actual nor probable monopoly power is essential to
a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. As the Brooke Court recog-
nized, since the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination that
may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, "[f]or
all the words of the Act to carry adequate meaning, competitive injury
under the Act must extend beyond the monopoly setting.' '73 Therefore,
recoupment cannot properly be viewed as a condition to Robinson-Pat-
man liability unless it can occur outside the monopoly setting. Otherwise,
the recoupment requirement restricts the Robinson-Patman Act so that it
reaches no further than the Sherman Act.
The question becomes whether recoupment can occur outside the mo-
nopoly setting. Prior lower court decisions strongly suggest that it cannot.
For example, in A.A. Poultry Farms74 the court held that there could be
no predatory pricing for Sherman Act purposes without some likelihood
of recoupment; however, it rejected the argument that recoupment is es-
sential to liability under the Robinson-Patman Act, stating: "Utah Pie
holds that the Robinson-Patman Act condemns at least some primary-
line price discrimination that the Sherman Act permits.' '75 The court rea-
soned that since under Utah Pie the Robinson-Patman Act reaches be-
yond the Sherman Act, recoupment cannot properly be a condition to
liability under the Robinson-Patman Act. Otherwise, the Acts would be
72. The Brooke Court stated: "The second prerequisite to holding a competitor liable
under the antitrust laws for charging low prices is a demonstration that the competitor had
a reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of re-
couping its investment in below-cost prices." 113 S. Ct. at 2588. The "dangerous
probability" terminology tracks that used by the Court in the past to describe the element
of monopoly power in a § 2 attempt case. See supra note 43. Since monopoly power,
either actual or prospective, is not a proper element in a Robinson-Patman case, the Court
could not describe the recoupment element for Robinson-Patman and Sherman Act cases
in the same terms. Yet, the Court was unable to describe the difference between the "rea-
sonable prospect" and "dangerous probability" standards. Indeed, the Court stated that
".. . whatever additional flexibility the Robinson-Patman Act standard may imply, the
essence of the claim under either statute is the same. . . ." Id. at 2587. In light of the
Brooke Court's application of the reasonable prospect standard as discussed below, there
appears to be no meaningful difference between the two formulations.
73. 113 S. Ct. at 2591.
74. 881 F.2d at 1396. The lower court's decision for the defendant was upheld because
the court of appeals found the plaintiff had failed to prove discriminatory pricing. Id. at
1406, 1408.
75. Id. at 1405. The court stated its disagreement with Utah Pie, but as an inferior
court applying a Supreme Court precedent, it properly chose not to disregard "the law on
the books." Id. The Robinson-Patman claim was denied, however, because the plaintiff
failed to prove price discrimination. Id. at 1406. Some commentators have misread A.A.
Poultry Farms as requiring a reasonable prospect for recoupment in a primary line Robin-
son-Patman case. ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KoVACIc, ANTITRUST LAW AND Ec-
ONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 441 (4th ed. 1994).
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coterminous in that neither could be violated outside the monopoly
setting.
On the other hand, Henry76 held a reasonable prospect of recoupment
essential to predatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act because
lessening of competition under that Act has the same meaning as at-
tempting to monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act.77 Just as
recoupment is necessary to establish a violation of section 2, so, the court
reasoned, it should be necessary to a violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act.
Although A.A. Poultry Farms and Henry disagreed on whether recoup-
ment was necessary to show a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act both
decisions were based on the premise that recoupment could occur only in
a monopoly setting. Whether recoupment was or was not a condition to
violating the Robinson-Patman Act depended upon the court's view of
that Act's relationship to the Sherman Act, in light of applicable Supreme
Court decisions.
As discussed,78 the Supreme Court relied on an oligopoly theory ad-
vanced by the plaintiffs to find recoupment possible outside the monop-
oly setting. Therefore, in the Court's view, establishing recoupment as an
essential element to predatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman Act
does not mean that Act is coterminous with the Sherman Act. The
Robinson-Patman Act reaches below-cost pricing with a reasonable pros-
pect of recoupment through supracompetitive oligopolistic pricing while
the Sherman Act requires a reasonable prospect of recoupment either
through: (1) the unilateral exercise of single firm monopoly power, or (2)
the joint exercise of monopoly power pursuant to a conspiracy.
The Court did not explicate the distinction between recoupment
through supracompetitive oligopolistic pricing and recoupment through
the joint exercise of monopoly power pursuant to a conspiracy. As sug-
gested by the lower court decisions discussed above, 79 the distinction is
problematic. The Supreme Court noted that "[w]ithout effective signal-
ing, it is difficult to see how [recoupment could have occurred]. ' 80 Sig-
naling meant a signal sent by Brown & Williamson to its competitors
indicating its price cuts were not a genuine competitive move, but were
intended to discipline Liggett and restore oligopoly pricing. To be "effec-
76. 809 F.2d at 1334.
77. Id. at 1345.
It is true that the Sherman Act speaks of attempt to monopolize, while
Robinson-Patman is aimed at lessening of competition; nevertheless, in order
to lessen competition, a defendant must be able to create a real possibility of
both driving out a rival by loss-creating price cutting and then holding on to
that advantage to recoup losses.
Id.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30, 42.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 74, 76. These cases suggest one cannot simulta-
neously claim that the Robinson-Patman Act reaches conduct beyond the Sherman Act,
and that the Robinson-Patman Act (like the Sherman Act) is violated only if the prospect
of recoupment is established.
80. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2597.
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tive" the signal must have "eliminated or rendered insignificant the risk
that other firms might misunderstand Brown & Williamson's entry [into
the generic market] as a competitive move." 81 Such an unmistakable sig-
nal, coupled with Brown & Williamson's below-cost pricing and any par-
allel price moves by competitors to restore oligopoly pricing, should be
sufficient to support a finding of conspiracy or combination to monopo-
lize in violation of section 2.82 Thus, evidence sufficient to establish a
reasonable prospect for recoupment under Brooke, implies a joint exer-
cise of monopoly power which in turns implies a violation of the Sherman
Act. So, the practical effect of the decision is to preclude a finding of
predatory pricing outside the monopoly setting.83
A.A. Poultry Farms reached the right result (recoupment not essential
to a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act) for the wrong reason (under
Utah Pie the Robinson-Patman Act wrongly condemns some primary line
price discrimination that the Sherman Act permits). In fact, as the
Brooke Court stated, statutory language and history, not Utah Pie, are
81. Id.
82. Parallel action alone will not support the inference of a conspiracy. Theatre En-
ters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954). However, it is a factor "to
be weighed, and generally to be weighed heavily," Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235
F.2d 573, 577 (10th Cir. 1956), along with other facts and circumstances. Facts and circum-
stances suggestive of conspiracy are sometimes referred to as "plus factors." When plus
factors are added to evidence of parallel action, a conspiracy may be inferred. See, e.g.,
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225-28 (1939); Dunnivant v. Bi-State
Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1583 (11th Cir. 1988); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d
522, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1987). Liggett introduced evidence of parallel increases in the list
price of both branded and generic cigarettes following the period of alleged predation.
Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2594. The Court held this evidence could not support a finding of
recoupment because sellers deviated from list prices in various ways. Id. at 2596. If, how-
ever, such parallel action had been linked with the unmistakable signal described by the
Court as essential to Liggett's recoupment theory, the signal would be a sufficient plus
factor to support inference of an agreement to fix list prices. And, of course, an agreement
to fix list prices would be unlawful whether or not they represented actual selling prices.
As the Court stated in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980), "when a
particular concerted activity entails an obvious risk of anticompetitive impact with no ap-
parent potentially redeeming value, the fact that a practice may turn out to be harmless in
a particular set of circumstances will not prevent its being declared unlawful per se." Id. at
649. It is hard to imagine any potentially redeeming value of an agreement to fix list
prices. Since such an agreement would be consistent with maximizing profits, it would not
be economically implausible under Matsushita and would therefore not be subject to an
elevated evidentiary standard. See supra text following note 35 for a discussion of Matsu-
shita and the elevated evidentiary standard applied by the Court in determining whether
evidence of an economically implausible conspiracy should be submitted to the factfinder.
Certainly this evidence of conspiracy would go beyond the evidence presented in such
shared monopoly cases as In re Kellogg Co., 81 F.T.C. 1031 (1972), in which the Federal
Trade Commission challenged under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act interdepen-
dent action by the leading makers of ready-to-eat cereals. Among other things, the Com-
mission claimed an implied conspiracy to monopolize could be inferred from evidence of
price leadership. Ultimately, the case was dismissed, over the objection of Commissioner
Pertschuk, who argued that the shared monopoly theory "is [supported] by scholarly com-
mentary, including that of Professors Areeda and Turner, Professor Sullivan and others."
99 F.T.C. 8 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
83. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 328 ("[l1t is doubtful that an oligopoly exists that




the source of the notion that the Robinson-Patman Act extends beyond
the Sherman Act. But the Brooke Court, unlike the courts of appeals in
A.A. Poultry and Henry, failed to grasp the incompatibility of that notion
with a recoupment requirement under the Robinson-Patman Act. If it
had, it either would not have adopted a recoupment requirement for
Robinson-Patman Act purposes, or it would have allowed the inference
of recoupment through oligopolistic pricing from evidence far short of
that required for proof of conspiracy. Instead, in practical effect, the
Brooke Court did what it claimed it would not do. Like the court of
appeals, the Brooke Court ignored Congress' intent, to reach through the
Robinson-Patman Act, some primary line discrimination that the Sher-
man Act allows.
The most likely explanation for the Brooke Court's treatment of the
recoupment issue is the notion that the antitrust laws, including the
Robinson-Patman Act, only prohibit conduct injurious to consumers. Be-
low-cost pricing with no reasonable prospect of recoupment cannot injure
consumers regardless of the predator's subjective intent because the
predator will never be able to realize its goal of increasing price. This
may or may not be sound policy. 84 However, the unavoidable fact is that
Congress clearly was not of that view when it adopted the Robinson-Pat-
man Act.85 This historical fact cannot be overcome by repeating the oft-
cited but inane phrase from Brown Shoe86 "that the antitrust laws were
passed for 'the protection of competition, not competitors.' "87 As is usu-
84. Clearly, policy makers sometimes choose to favor producers over consumers. See
supra note 38 and infra note 89. The point, of course, is not that a law favoring producers
over consumers is better than one that does not, but that, Supreme Court proclamations
notwithstanding, rational beings sometimes decide that to be the case. Therefore, the
Court cannot properly close its eyes to the.possibility that the Robinson-Patman Act was
not intended solely to advance consumer interests. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of
Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 554, 566-67 (1986).
85. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 23, at 385 ("The statute proceeds from the idea that
price discrimination is a means of injuring competitors, usually small ones, and that injury
to competitors results in injury to competition.") Id. It has been suggested that Congress
was mainly concerned with secondary line discrimination and did not intend to affect the
legal status of primary line discrimination. See, e.g., Henry, 809 F.2d at 1339. It is undoubt-
edly true that the "political impulse underlying the law was an impulse to control changes
in the channels of distribution." ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT 22, n.89 (1962). Nothing in the legislative history or the language of the Act
supports the notion that Congress responded to this impulse by limiting the Act to secon-
dary line discrimination. See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936)
(Prior law had been too restrictive, in requiring a showing of general injury
to competitive conditions. . ., whereas the more immediately important con-
cern is in injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination. Only
through such injuries, in fact, can the larger general injury result, and to catch
the weed in the seed will keep it from coming to flower.)
Id.
86. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
87. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320) (emphasis in
the original). This phrase fairly can be characterized as inane or empty, because it sheds no
light on how courts should respond to the tension between a statute condemning practices
that may injure competition, and the plain intent of Congress to protect both competitors
and consumers. The phrase assumes protection of competition has a single and self-evi-
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ally the case when this empty slogan is quoted, the Brooke Court ne-
glected to mention a subsequent sentence in the Brown Shoe opinion:
"But we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition
through the protection of viable, small, locally owned business." 88
Whatever the wisdom of protecting small business, Congress clearly had
that concern in adopting the Robinson-Patman Act.89 This does not
mean every price discrimination harmful to a competitor should be un-
lawful.90 However, if, as Congress intended, the Robinson-Patman Act is
dent meaning under the Clayton Act that excludes concern for competitors. When consid-
ered in the context of the Brown Shoe opinion and the legislative history of the Clayton
Act, that assumption is plainly unpersuasive. See infra note 88.
88. 370 U.S. at 344. When this statement is quoted in context, it is often ridiculed as
incoherent. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 23, at 216 ("No matter how many times you read it,
that passage states: although mergers are not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small
independent stores may be adversely affected, we must recognize that mergers are unlaw-
ful when small independent stores may be adversely affected.") Id. In fact, the statement
captures the legislative belief that injury to competitors is relevant to but not determinative
of injury to competition. To "catch the weed in the seed," S. REP. No. 1502, supra note 85,
at 4, one must predict competitive injury before it occurs. Injury to competitors may be
relevant to that prediction. If one believes this incipiency doctrine represents bad policy,
see, e.g., BORK, supra note 23, at 131 ("The incipiency concept appears to have no value
whatever..."), the proper course is to urge revision of the statute to remove the explicit
reference to probable competitive injury. Bork and other Chicago School economists
choose instead to revise the antitrust statutes by asserting the obvious fact that the statutes
were intended to protect competition, and then defining competition in a way that suits
their purpose. No one would disagree with the proposition that the antitrust laws were
intended to protect competition. But the devil is in the details. What did "competition"
mean to Congress when it adopted the antitrust laws? The legislative history lends far
more support to the notion that Congress had a broad view of competition as a system
concerned with the interests of small business as well as consumers, than to the notion that
it had a narrow view of competition as concerned with consumer interests alone. See John
J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration's Antitrust Policy, "Original Intent" and the Legisla-
tive History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTTRusT BuLL. 259 (1988); Frederick M. Rowe, The
Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics,
72 GEO. L.J. 1511 (1984). Of course, one can always assert that "the will of Congress
contains internal contradictions," BORK, supra note 23, at 409, and is not worthy of serious
consideration by the courts. A more judicious if less tidy approach, such as that of the
Supreme Court in Brown Shoe, recognizes that proper application of the antitrust laws
often requires a balancing of competing goals embraced by Congress.
89. That Congress chooses to balance consumer interests against the interests of small
business is neither alarming nor unique. The Miller-'ydings Amendment to § 1 of the
Sherman Act, adopted one year after adoption of the Robinson-Patman Act, exempted
from the Sherman Act vertical price fixing under state fair trade legislation, because loss-
leader selling at the retail level "has had a disastrous effect upon the small independent
retailer." S. REP. No. 2053, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1937). Loss leader selling by large retail-
ers obviously benefitted consumers, but, in Congress' view, at too great a cost to the small
independent retailer. That view changed by 1975 when Congress repealed Miller-T'ydings
in response to pro-consumer lobbying. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, P.L. 94-12,89
Stat. 801 (1975). Congress could, of course, repeal the Robinson-Patman Act or amend it
to prohibit only price discrimination injurious to consumers. Perhaps it should. That does
not mean, however, that the Court should act in its stead by adopting conditions which
either can never be met, or when met mean the Robinson-Patman Act simply duplicates
the Sherman Act.
90. Under the "diversion of business" test employed at one time by the Federal Trade
Commission, injury to competition automatically could be inferred from a discriminatory
price which diverted business from a competitor. See Borden Co. [1963-65 Transfer
Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 16, 776. The Commission's decision in Borden was
vacted on appeal. See Borden Co. v. FrC, 339 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1964). Subsequent deci-
1855
SMU LAW REVIEW
to extend beyond the monopoly setting, the Court must apply the Act to
conduct that does not implicate the power to raise price and restrict out-
put unilaterally or through conspiracy. Contrary to Brooke, therefore,
recoupment either should not be a prerequisite to a Robinson-Patman
Act violation, or if it is, recoupment should be susceptible to proof
through evidence far short of that required to establish the probability of
achieving monopoly power, or the conspiratorial exercise of monopoly
power.
Robinson-Patman Act liability without recoupment need not have
opened the floodgates to anticonsumer litigation. Under the cost-based
test adopted in Brooke there can be no liability for discriminatory price
cutting unless prices are reduced below cost. Pricing below cost is the
exception rather than the rule, and will always be temporary. Thus, po-
tential Robinson-Patman Act liability for pricing below cost without a
reasonable prospect for recoupment would pose little risk of deterring
legitimate price competition. At most, consumers would stand to lose the
benefit of discriminatory price cuts that are temporary, and then only to
the extent prices are reduced below cost.
Aside from the question whether the Court should have adopted a re-
coupment requirement for predatory pricing under the Robinson-Patman
Act, further questions arise concerning the role of economic theory in its
application of the requirement.
3. The Role of Economic Theory and the Recoupment Requirement
The jury found that a reasonable possibility of recoupment existed at
the time Brown & Williamson priced below cost.91 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court held that the record contained sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that Brown & Williamson be-
lieved it could recoup its losses by forcing Liggett to raise the price of
generics, thereby narrowing the gap between generics and branded ciga-
rettes.92 In short, both the jury and Brown & Williamson management
believed there was a reasonable prospect for recoupment through oligo-
polistic pricing. 93
Against this record, the Court held that "as a matter of law,.. . [t]he
evidence is inadequate to show that... Brown & Williamson had a rea-
sions by the Commission have abandoned the diversion of business test. See Beatrice
Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719,800 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 68 F.T.C. 217, 260
(1965), aff'd, 371 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1966).
91. 113 S. Ct. at 2599 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Brown & Williamson
challenged this finding as based on instructions that were "unclear, inconsistent and fatally
flawed," Stephen Calkins, The October 1992 Supreme Court Terms and Antitrust: More
Objectivity Than Ever, 62 ANTIrRUST L.J. 327, 381 (1994), the Court did not reject the
finding as based on flawed instructions or for any reason other than the insufficiency of the
evidence. See Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2598.
92. Id. at 2592.
93. Had the jury's finding on recoupment been upheld, its finding of probable compet-
itive injury and the verdict for Liggett would also have been upheld.
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sonable prospect of recovering its losses from below-cost pricing through
slowing the growth of generics. ' 94 The opinion suggests that the Court
viewed the facts through a different economic prism than did the jury or
Brown & Williamson management.
When Brown & Williamson entered the generic segment of the market,
the industry faced declining demand and possessed substantial excess ca-
pacity.95 These conditions, the Court concluded, coupled with a large
number of product types and pricing variables, made oligopoly pricing
unmanageable. 96 Why? Because economic theory tells us the "inherent
limitations of tacit collusion suggest that such multivariable coordination
is improbable." 97 These "inherent limitations" were revealed to the
Court, but apparently not to the Brown & Williamson management or to
the jury, (despite extensive expert testimony) by the writings of economic
theorists.98 Because, under the Court's view of economic theory, an "an-
ticompetitive minuet is most difficult to compose and to perform, even
for a disciplined oligopoly," 99 it closed its eyes to powerful evidence that
the highly concentrated cigarette industry with a strong tradition of inter-
dependent pricing might have been up to the task. The Brown & Wil-
liamson management believed that it was, and as Justice Stevens stated in
dissent, "the professional performers who had danced the minuet for 40
to 50 years would be better able to predict whether their favorite partners
would follow them in the future than would an outsider, who might not
know the difference between Haydn and Mozart."'1
Under the business judgment rule, courts commonly defer to the exper-
tise of management in reviewing management decisions. The Court
failed to explain why, in this context, management's judgment concerning
the feasibility of recoupment, and a jury finding consistent with that judg-
ment should be rejected as irrational. It is also worth noting that while
Brown & Williamson's subjective expectation of recoupment through
oligopolistic pricing was accorded little if any weight in assessing the like-
lihood of recoupment, statements by Liggett officers that pricing in the
cigarette industry was competitive rather than oligopolistic were viewed
by the Court as virtually conclusive evidence that recoupment was im-
probable. 1 1 If the case had been brought by the government, such state-
ments by industry executives would have been disregarded as self-
serving. The fact Liggett was the plaintiff does not change their self-serv-
ing nature. It means only that the Liggett executives were put to a
94. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2592.
95. Id at 2596.
96. Id
97. Id.
98. Id The Court relied on two economic texts: ROBERT DORFMAN, THE PRICE SYS.
TEM 99-100, and n.10 (1964), and F. SCHERER & D. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUC-
TURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 279 (3d ed. 1990). See id
99. 113 S. Ct. at 2590.
100. Id at 2605.
101. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2595. Compare supra text accompanying note 51 with supra
text accompanying note 55.
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choice: Either abandon your lawsuit by claiming the cigarette industry is
highly competitive and likely to remain so or admit to being a price
gouger. It is easy to see why any defense lawyer would pursue this clever
line of questioning. It is difficult to see what the executives' choice had to
do with an objective search for truth, and it is astonishing that the
Supreme Court was taken in by so transparent a device.
Although the Court stated that a reasonable jury is presumed to under-
stand the realities of the market, 0 2 practical market realities were not
critical to the Court's decision. Brown & Williamson's management had
an infinitely better grasp of market realities than did the Court. Yet, the
Court freely substituted its judgment of market realities for that of the
Brown & Williamson management. Moreover, the Court's frequent ref-
erences to economic textbooks and articles made clear that when it spoke
of "market realities," it meant abstract economic theory. Since the rea-
sonableness of the expectation of recoupment was tested against eco-
nomic theory rather than actual market realities, it is not surprising the
Court gave greater weight to economic textbook writers than to the
Brown & Williamson management.
This explains why the Court undertook a factual review described by
one commentator as "astonishing."' 01 3 In reality the Court was not simply
reviewing facts under the clearly erroneous standard. Nor did it adopt an
elevated standard of proof in light of the economic implausibility of the
plaintiff's recoupment theory, an approach supported by Matsushita.'°4
Instead, the Court applied economic theory to overrule fact- findings in
much the same way as did the court of appeals.
The Court's error in Brooke seems clear enough. The difficult question
is whether Brooke is aberrational or representative of a trend toward the
elevation of economic theory to legal doctrine in antitrust analysis. Re-
coupment is a concept mainly important to predatory pricing. It does not
cut across all areas of antitrust. This may be significant in assessing the
Court's willingness to permit economic theory to override record facts in
102. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2598.
103. Calkins, supra note 91, at 385. Professor Calkins went on to observe: "The Court
wrote that it 'is not customary for this Court to review the sufficiency of the evidence'-
and then, by engaging in such a review, demonstrated why such reviews are so rarely prof-
itable." Id. at 385 (quoting Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2591).
104. See supra text following note 35 for a discussion of Matsushita. There the Court
adopted an elevated evidentiary standard that applies in determining whether a plaintiff
has produced sufficient evidence of an economically implausible conspiracy for submission
to the jury. Unless the evidence tends to exclude independent action, it does not raise a
genuine issue of fact and a motion to dismiss should be granted. Similarly, the Brooke
Court might have held that once the plaintiff meets its burden of producing evidence and
the case is submitted to the jury, economically implausible findings must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence rather than the usual preponderance of the evidence. Such
an approach would have applied an elevated evidentiary standard in determining whether
the plaintiff had met its burden of proof, just as Matsushita applied an elevated evidentiary
standard in determining whether the plaintiff had met its burden of production. For a
comparison of the burden of production and the burden of proof see, Shores, supra note
38, at 295-300.
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other areas of antitrust, a matter considered below, 10 5 following examina-
tion of the Kodak decision which, like Brooke, involved powerful tension
between economic theory and record facts.
III. THE KODAK CASE
One year before handing down its decision in Brooke, the Court faced
a similar issue concerning the relationship of law and economics in Ko-
dak.106 Despite the similarity of the underlying issue, the factual setting
of Kodak was very different from that of Brooke, as was the Court's anal-
ysis and conclusions.
Image Technical Services, Inc. was an independent service organization
(ISO) competing with Kodak in providing parts and service to users of
photocopier and micrographics equipment manufactured by Kodak.
Parts for Kodak equipment and similar equipment manufactured by
others were not interchangeable, and Kodak controlled the production
and sale of Kodak parts. In 1985, Kodak restricted the availability of its
parts by selling only to users who also purchased its service or who ser-
viced their own equipment. Unable to obtain Kodak parts, many ISOs
were forced out of business and users of Kodak equipment were forced to
switch to Kodak service even though they preferred ISO service.
A. THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC THEORIES
The ISOs claimed that Kodak violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by
tying the sale of parts to the sale of service. The theory of a tying case is
that the antitrust law is violated when a seller with market power in Prod-
uct A uses that power to sell Product B by tying the products together
and forcing a purchaser of Product A to also purchase Product B. Con-
sumers are harmed by being forced to take a product they do not want, or
one they would prefer to buy elsewhere. Competing producers of Prod-
uct B are harmed in that their products are rejected in favor of inferior
products forced on the consumer through the tie. 107
Since forcing can occur only if the seller has market power with respect
to the tying product, tying arrangements are subject to a conditional per
se rule under which they are generally presumed unlawful if the requisite
market power is established.'08 Market power simply means "some spe-
cial ability.., to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do
105. See infra text accompanying note 162.
106. 112 S. Ct. at 2072.
107. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 nn.21-24 (1984).
108. See Hyde, 466 U.S. at 9 ("It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurispru-
dence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable
risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se'.") Id. The Supreme
Court has recognized a second condition to application of the per se rule. Sales of the tied
product must comprise a not insubstantial amount of commerce. Id. at 16. This is essen-
tially a de mininus rule intended to screen out cases that are too insignificant to warrant
consideration under the federal antitrust laws; see Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States




in a competitive market."'109 Although theoretically possible, it is highly
unlikely a tie not subject to the per se rule would violate the antitrust
law'1 0 , and the plaintiff in Kodak relied on the per se theory.
As with predatory pricing, the traditional legal analysis of tying ar-
rangements has been severely criticized by Chicago School economists. 1 1
Underlying the criticism is the premise that consumer welfare is the sole
concern of antitrust.1 2 Thus, a tying arrangement, or any other business
practice, should violate the antitrust laws only if it adversely affects con-
sumer interests. The fact that a competing seller of the tied product may
not be able to compete on the merits is irrelevant. Furthermore, it is
argued, economic theory reveals that consumer interests generally are
not adversely affected by tying arrangements regardless of market power.
To the extent the customer is forced to take a product she does not want,
the consumer is simply paying the market price for a product she does
want.
For example, suppose the competitive price for a particular Kodak part
is five dollars, and a competitive price for installation of the part is twelve
dollars. Kodak has power in the parts market and can charge seven dol-
lars, two dollars more than the competitive price. However, suppose Ko-
dak is weak in the service market and cannot sell its installation service at
the competitive price of twelve dollars. In order to force the sale of serv-
ices, Kodak ties the services to the parts. Under traditional tying theory,
Kodak has violated the Sherman Act because it has used power in the
parts market to force the consumer to take services she would prefer to
buy elsewhere.
Economic theory tells us, however, that market power cannot be used
twice. Thus, Kodak could either exhaust its market power in the parts
market by charging a supracompetitive price of seven dollars for the part
sold without a tie, or could use its market power in the parts market to
sell services; but it could not do both. So, if Kodak is selling the part
without a tie at a price of seven dollars (two dollars above the competi-
(Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying prod-
uct so that it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers into
taking the tied item any restraint of trade attributable to such tying arrange-
ments would obviously be insignificant at most. As a simple example, if one
of a dozen food stores in a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the
buyer also took sugar it would hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if
its competitors were ready and able to sell flour by itself.)
Id.
109. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 13-14.
110. The main reason for this is the conditional nature of the per se rule of tying ar-
rangements. See supra note 108, and accompanying text. If, as Kodak argued, the per se
rule did not apply because Kodak lacked market power in the tying product, that same lack
of market power would make it difficult or impossible to show a violation under the rule of
reason. See Great Escape, Inc. v. Union City Body Co., 791 F.2d 532, 537-38 (7th Cir.
1986); Hand v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 779 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129
1986); Hudson's Bay Co. Fur Sales v. American Legend Coop., 651 F. Supp. 819, 841
D.N.J. 1986).
111. See BORK, supra note 23, at 372-75.
112. Id. at 375.
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tive price of five dollars), but cannot sell its installation service at a com-
petitive price of twelve dollars, it can do one of two things. First, it might
lower the price of service to ten dollars and continue to sell the part and
service separately priced at seven dollars and ten dollars respectively.
The subcompetitive price for services will make them more attractive to
customers and increase sales.
Alternatively, it could tie the sale of services to the sale of parts and
charge seventeen dollars for the package. The package price of seven-
teen dollars would increase sales of service just as would separate prices
of seven dollars for the part and ten dollars for the service. Whether one
views the package price as comprised of seven dollars for the part and ten
dollars for the service, or five dollars for the part and twelve dollars for
the service is a matter of indifference. The crucial point is that a package
price of nineteen dollars will not enable Kodak to increase the sale of
services above the level that would prevail if the part and service were
sold separately for seven dollars and twelve dollars respectively. Instead
of increasing the sale of services, a package price of nineteen dollars
would decrease sales of parts, since it exceeds the sum (seventeen dollars)
of the amounts consumers are willing to pay for the Kodak part (seven
dollars) and the Kodak service (ten dollars).
In short, since market power can be used only once, if market power
with respect to the part is used to sell services, it also cannot be reflected
in the price for the part. Under this theory, consumers will never pay
more for the package than they would pay for the individual products,
and tying cannot adversely affect consumer welfare. This is what Justice
O'Connor had in mind when she observed:
The existence of a tied product normally does not increase the profit
that the seller with market power can extract from sales of the tying
product. A seller with a monopoly on flour, for example, cannot in-
crease the profit it can extract from flour consumers simply by forc-
ing them to buy sugar along with their flour. Counterintuitive
though that assertion may seem, it is easily demonstrated and widely
accepted. 113
The demonstrations provided by the authorities on which Justice
O'Connor relied are hypothetical. Like the hypothetical example pro-
vided above, they do not rely on empirical evidence.
While the logic seems irrefutable, the idea that market realities invaria-
bly correspond to economic theory is no more clear in this context than in
the predatory pricing context. Nor is it clear how one would gather em-
pirical evidence to demonstrate that they do correspond. If it were clear,
the literature and appellate court opinions would be filled with such evi-
dence. They are not. Furthermore, if the consumer is indifferent be-
tween a package price of seventeen dollars, or an untied price of seven
dollars for the part and ten dollars for the service, the producer should
113. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (acknowledging BORK, supra note
23, at 372-74; PHIuLP AREEDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS 735 (3d ed. 1981)).
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also be indifferent. As Justice O'Connor pointed out, economic theory
tells us that a tie cannot increase the profit that a producer with market
power can extract from its customers.114 Indeed, it is the inability of pro-
ducers to do so that supposedly renders the tie harmless to consumers.
But if producers are indifferent, one must ask why they regularly spend
large amounts of money to defend tying arrangements in the courts. If
selling with or without the tie is equally profitable, a rational seller facing
the costs of defending a tying arrangement would choose not to use it, or
at least would abandon it when challenged. One suspects sellers know
something of the market realities that has eluded economic
theoreticians." 5
But the whole issue should be irrelevant to any matter before the
courts. Whether tying arrangements involving market power violate the
antitrust laws is a legal, not an economic issue. It is clear that when Con-
gress adopted the Clayton Act, it believed that such tying arrangements
were harmful and intended to condemn them. 116 Arguments to the con-
trary based on economic theory ought to be addressed to Congress. It is
better equipped than are judges to gauge the congruence of market reali-
114. Id.
115. Perhaps sellers would choose to use the tie because it is efficient. Efficiency is the
standard explanation Chicago School economics provides for nearly all business activity.
But that begs the question. It might be reasonable to assume an efficiency explanation if
there is no other explanation, such as enhanced power over price. Whether the tie in-
creases power over price is the question to be resolved, and it cannot be resolved by as-
suming the tie is efficiency-driven rather than power-driven.
The failure of economics to come to grips with issues of this type has not gone unnoticed.
For example, one might ask: how do we know market power cannot be used twice, once to
sell for $7 a part with a competitive price of $5, and again to sell for $12 a tied service
which would bring only $10 if sold separately? The answer provided by economic theory is
that the consumer is a rational maximizer, and paying a package price of $19 would not
maximize utility. But, as has been observed,
[tihe rational utility maximizer of economic theory bears no resemblance to
the man on the Clapham bus or, indeed, to any man (or woman) on any bus.
There is no reason to suppose that most human beings are engaged in maxi-
mizing anything unless it be unhappiness, and even this with incomplete
success.
RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 3-4 (1988).
116. The House Report on the Clayton Act stated:
Where the concern making these (tying) contracts is already great and pow-
erful, such as the United Shoe Machinery Co., the American Tobacco Co.,
and the General Film Co .... (it) becomes one of the greatest agencies and
instrumentalities of monopoly ever devised by the brain of man. It com-
pletely shuts out competitors .... When we consider contracts of sale made
under this system, the result to the consumer, the general public, and the
local dealer and his business is even worse than under the (exclusive) lease
systems.
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1914). In Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
1 (1912), the manufacturer of a stencil-duplicating machine required that the machine be
used only with paper, ink and other supplies sold by the manufacturer. In a four-to-three
decision the Court held the arrangement lawful under the Sherman Act. Id. at 49. Dissat-
isfaction with the A.B. Dick decision, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)
and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), prompted Congress to
enact the Clayton Act.
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ties and economic theory. And anyway, such choices are properly within
its institutional role, not that of the courts.117
B. THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND THE ISSUE ON APPEAL
The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Kodak after
limited discovery. Kodak did not challenge the basic proposition that a
tying arrangement is unlawful if the seller has power in the market for the
tying product, and the critical question before the Supreme Court was
whether there was a genuine issue concerning Kodak's market power
with respect to parts. Kodak claimed that the equipment market was
competitive and, since this assertion was not disputed in the lower courts,
the Supreme Court assumed it to be correct." 8 Economic analysis, Ko-
dak argued, demonstrated that power in the parts market was theoreti-
cally impossible without power in the equipment market. If the price of
parts was raised above a competitive level, customers would switch to
other equipment. Thus, the competitive pressure that restrained the price
of Kodak equipment necessarily restrained the price of Kodak parts.119
As in Brooke, the decision in Kodak turned on whether economic the-
ory could foreclose factual analysis. Liggett failed to prove a violation
because economic theory precluded a reasonable expectation of recoup-
ment. It did not matter that Brown & Williamson expected to recoup
profits lost due to below-cost pricing, and that the jury found that expec-
tation to be reasonable. Similarly, Kodak sought to prevent a trial on the
market power issue because, regardless of the evidence, economic theory
precluded a finding of power in the parts market, and without power in
the parts market the plaintiff's per se theory failed.
C. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Court rejected Kodak's argument on both theoretical and practical
grounds. At a theoretical level, the Court viewed Kodak's theory as de-
pendent upon cross-elasticity of demand, and found the theory want-
ing.' 20 Cross-elasticity of demand is the responsiveness of demand for
product A to changes in the price of product B. The Court recognized
117. See Hyde, 466 U.S. at 9 ("It is far too late in the history of our antiturst jurispru-
dence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable
risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se' "). Of course, it is never
too late to question before Congress the wisdom of statutory law. However, legislative
proposals to bring antitrust statutes into harmony with Chicago School economics have not
fared well in Congress. See MARC A. EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOM-
Ics 208-10 (1991); Nira Weisel, Note, The 1980's Amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act
and the Revitalized Per Se Illegality of Resale Price Maintenance, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 1435
(1988).
118. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2081 n.10.
119. Id. at 2081.
120. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2084. The Court stated: "The extent to which one market
[e.g., equipment] prevents exploitation of another market [e.g., parts] depends on the ex-
tent to which consumers will change their consumption of one product in response to a
price change in another, i.e., the 'cross-elasticity of demand.'" Id. at 2083.
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that this concept has generally been used by the courts to define the rele-
vant product market.121 For example, if one is seeking to determine the
share of the market controlled by the seller of product A, a determination
must be made whether the market includes product B. If the products
are functionally interchangeable so that users can switch from one to the
other, some competition between them is likely. Cross-elasticity of de-
mand is helpful in determining whether the degree of competition is great
enough to place the products in the same market. If a competitive price
for product A is five dollars, and a five percent increase in the price of
product A will cause enough users to shift from product A to product B
to make the price increase unprofitable, cross-elasticity of demand is
high, and the products should probably be in the same market. 122
In assessing cross-elasticity of demand, it is important not to use the
historical price of product A as a baseline for determining the effect of
price moves, unless the historical price is a competitive price. For exam-
ple, although the competitive price of product A is five dollars, it is possi-
ble that the producer of product A has historically charged seven dollars
due to lack of competition. Evidence may show that when the price was
raised 5%, from $7 to $7.35, users switched to product B. Such evidence
does not establish a high cross-elasticity of demand because users did not
switch until the price was $7.35, nearly 50% more than the competitive
price of $5. But, if the historical price rather than the competitive price is
used as a baseline, one would conclude that a high cross-elasticity of de-
mand exists. This would then incorrectly indicate that the products are in
the same market.' 23 This improper use of historical price as a baseline in
assessing cross-elasticity of demand can be referred to as the historical
price error.
The historical price error was a significant part of the Kodak Court's
analysis. The Court correctly observed that the seller of product A in the
above example would have market power if it had historically charged a
supracompetitive price for product A, even if it could not raise the price
one cent without losing an unacceptable number of customers. 124 The
fact that at some price customers will switch to other products does not
disprove market power, since even a monopolist does not have unlimited
power over price. 125 Similarly, the Court reasoned, the fact that Kodak
121. Id. at 2084.
122. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. 377,400 (1956); U.S. Dep't
of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.12, 57 Fed.
Reg. 41552.
123. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 400.
124. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2084. The Court quoted from AREEDA & KAPLOW, ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS I 340(b) (4th ed. 1988), where the authors discuss the historical price
error.
125. It is arguable that market constraints on monopoly pricing are sufficiently stringent
to make antitrust law unnecessary. Justice Holmes said it well:
I think that we greatly exaggerate the value and importance to the public of
competition in the production or distribution of an article ... as fixing a fair
price. What really fixes that is the competition of conflicting desires. We,
none of us, can have as much as we want of all the things that we want.
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might lose sales of equipment if it raises its price for parts does not dis-
prove market power in the parts market. As put by the Court: "The fact
that the equipment market imposes a restraint on prices in the
aftermarkets by no means disproves the existence of power in those mar-
kets.' x26 In effect, the Court concluded that Kodak's theory was under-
cut by the historical price error.
The Court's reasoning is not compelling. Kodak's theory did involve
the cross-elasticity of demand concept, and that concept often implicates
the historical price error. However, since Kodak did not present evidence
that increases in its price for parts had caused it to lose equipment
sales, 27 it is not clear how the historical price error undercut Kodak's
theory. If it had presented such evidence, the Court's reasoning would
have been persuasive. The question then would have been whether the
historical price for parts used by Kodak as a baseline in arguing that price
increases caused it to lose equipment sales, was a competitive price. If
the competitive price was $5, but a historical price of $7 had been used as
a baseline to determine the effect of price increases, then a decrease in
equipment sales when the price of parts was raised to $7.35 would not
disprove the existence of market power in the parts market. It would
merely prove that such market power was not unlimited.
Kodak's theory was different. It relied on market share analysis to
prove lack of market power in the equipment market, and the plaintiff
did not challenge this assertion. 128 Kodak then argued that since the de-
mand for parts is derived from the demand for equipment, a competitive
equipment market forced Kodak to charge a competitive price for parts.
Under Kodak's theory there was no room for the historical price error
because economic theory dictated a competitive price for parts. As
stated by Justice Scalia in dissent, "If Kodak set generally supracompeti-
tive prices for either spare parts or repair services without making an
offsetting reduction in the price of its machines, rational consumers would
Therefore, we have to choose. As soon as the price of something that we
want goes above the point at which we are willing to give up other things to
have that, we cease to buy it and buy something else.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Under this view, there is little or no need for antitrust legislation. Indeed,
Justice Holmes considered the Sherman Act "humbug." HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS 163
(M. Howe ed., 1941). So does the Chicago School, for much the same reason. See Easter-
brook, supra note 24, at 31 (stating it would be hard to compile a list of ten cases in the
history of antitrust that should have been allowed to go to trial). While this is a perfectly
legitimate political/economic view, it is not the view Congress adopted. Congress' view
should be more important from the standpoint of proper judicial (as opposed to legislative)
decision making, than the political/economic preferences of individual judges. Unlike most
proponents of the Chicago School, Holmes also honored this point: "I strongly believe that
my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody
their opinions in law." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
126. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2084.
127. In fact, the evidence showed that the price of service increased, but there was no
evidence that equipment sales declined. Id at 2085.
128. Id. at 2081 n.10.
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simply turn to Kodak's competitors for photocopying and micrographic
systems."129
Kodak (as supported by Justice Scalia) was undoubtedly correct in its
economic theory. As a theoretical matter, if it possessed no power in the
market for equipment, it could possess no power in the market for parts
because the market for parts was a function of, or was derived from, the
market for equipment. Any increase in the price of parts would simply
cause customers to switch to another equipment supplier. Although the
Court was unpersuasive in its use of the historical price error to challenge
Kodak's theory of derived demand, it correctly concluded that the real
question is whether market realities correspond to economic theory. The
existence of significant information and switching costs, the Court ob-
served, could create a less responsive connection between the demand for
equipment and the price of parts than economic theory would suggest.130
Purchasers of equipment cannot take into account the cost of parts and
service over the life of the equipment unless, at the time or purchasing
their equipment, they know what those costs will be. If accurate informa-
tion is available to customers and no other market impediments exist,
customers would behave according to economic theory and make equip-
ment purchasing decisions by comparing the cost of owning Kodak equip-
ment over its lifecycle with the cost of owning a competing brand. Kodak
would then be forced to price both its equipment and parts competitively,
so long as competition exists in the equipment market. Whether such
lifecycle pricing actually occurs obviously raises a factual issue. If it does
not, and many customers are largely in the dark concerning the cost of
parts when they make equipment purchasing decisions, Kodak's theory
fails. It simply does not reflect market reality.
Economic theory need not be, and seldom is, concerned with resolving
such factual issues. Its main function is to assist in the interpretation of
facts by explaining why, if a certain premise exists, a certain conclusion
will follow. Of course, the premise must be plausible for the theory to be
useful. But whether the premise exists in a specific case is unimportant to
the economist. The unstated premise of Kodak's economic theory was
that purchasers of equipment know the price of parts at the time of
purchasing equipment, or at least that such information is generally
available.
One might argue, as did the dissent, that customers who purchase
equipment without regard to the cost of parts and service are irrational
and should not be of concern to the antitrust laws.13' That argument as-
sumes, however, that information is available through cost-effective
means, which is the question to be resolved. As the Court observed: "If
the costs of service are small relative to the equipment price, or if con-
sumers are more concerned about equipment capabilities than service
129. Id. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 2085.
131. Id. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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costs, they may not find it cost-efficient to compile the information."' 132
This does not mean consumers act irrationally in failing to compile the
information. It means, rather, that this is a case of market failure. This
particular market fails to perform according to economic theory, not be-
cause the theory is unsound, but because a premise (readily available in-
formation) upon which the theory is constructed does not exist.
Even if purchasers had sufficient information to engage in lifecycle
pricing, the Court concluded, there is no guarantee that the projected cost
of parts and service will prove accurate. If the number of new equipment
customers is low compared to the number of old equipment customers
(current users), and old customers cannot readily switch to other brands
of equipment, it might be profitable for Kodak to sacrifice some sales of
new equipment in order to raise the price of parts and service to all users.
Old equipment customers would be forced to choose between paying the
supracompetitive price for parts and service or bearing the cost of switch-
ing to another brand of equipment. If switching costs are sufficiently
high, Kodak might have power to charge a supracompetitive price for
parts. Although it could lawfully do so, Kodak could not lawfully use its
market power over parts to sell service by tying the service to parts.
Factual issues concerning information and switching costs led the Court
to conclude that economic theory did not preclude the possibility that
Kodak had power in the parts market despite its stipulated lack of power
in the equipment market.133 The plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to a
trial.134
D. THE DISSENT
Justice Scalia began his dissent with the sweeping proposition that com-
petition in the equipment market precluded market power in the parts
market. 135 To support this conclusion, he argued that since Kodak did
not have market power with respect to equipment, it could have used
equipment as the tying product without running afoul of the per se rule.
Since ISOs purchased no equipment, a tie of parts to equipment would
preclude them from purchasing parts, just as did a tie of parts to service.
The practical effect on the ISOs would be the same. "The only thing lack-
ing," Justice Scalia stated, to make Kodak's actual practice analogous to
the hypothetical tie of equipment to parts, "is concrete evidence that the
restrictive parts policy was announced or generally known."'1 36 But, as
132. Id. at 2086.
133. Id. at 2083-89.
134. Id. at 2089.
135. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2092 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Like the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Liggett Group, see supra text following note 31, Justice Scalia elevated
economic theory to a rule of law.
136. Id. at 2096.
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the majority pointed out, the "only thing lacking" was the "crucial thing
lacking-evidence.'1 37
If, as Justice Scalia hypothesized, Kodak had sold equipment on the
condition that the buyer agree to purchase parts and service from Kodak,
the buyer would be unlikely to enter such an agreement without solid
cost information, and perhaps a guarantee that the future cost of parts
and service would not exceed specified amounts. In other words, such
evidence would strongly suggest that buyers were making decisions based
on lifecycle pricing. Kodak's lack of market power in the equipment mar-
ket would then force it to charge a competitive price for parts and service.
Otherwise, the purchaser would go elsewhere. Indeed, it is possible that
Kodak tied parts to service rather than parts and service to equipment
because the latter tie would induce lifecycle pricing. The main point of
the majority opinion was that the record did not make clear whether pur-
chasers had sufficient information to engage in lifecycle pricing. If they
did not have such information, then competitive pressure in the equip-
ment market would not affect the exercise of market power in the parts
market.
Justice Scalia acknowledged that either a lack of information or switch-
ing costs, could indicate that competition in the equipment market would
not restrain market power in the parts market. However, relying on a
dissenting opinion by Judge Posner, Justice Scalia concluded that while
under these circumstances "power can plainly work to the injury of cer-
tain consumers, it ... [is] 'not the sort of thing the antitrust laws do or
should worry about.'-"138
This approach to antitrust is analogous to that of Chicago School econ-
omists approach to empirical research. As one commentator has ob-
served, "The theoretical hard core of the Chicago school is protected by a
simple rule with respect empirical research: 'If inconsistent with what was
previously believed, it must be wrong.' ",139 To the extent the potential
137. Id. at 2087 n.24. "Whether a tie between parts and service should be treated identi-
cally to a tie between equipment and service," the majority continued, ". . . depends on
whether the equipment market prevents the exertion of market power in the parts mar-
ket." Id. Full disclosure of the restrictive parts policy from the outset (Kodak first made
parts freely available to ISOs and then switched to a restrictive policy) would make life-
cycle pricing more likely. If lifecycle pricing occurred, it woulld restrain the exertion of
market power in the parts market and make a violation unlikely. One cannot assume,
however, from the fact of full disclosure that lifecycle pricing occurred. That would still
present a factual issue to be resolved at trial. It seems likely, therefore, that the Kodak
Court would have reached the same result even if the restrictive parts policy had been
announced from the outset. Cf Post-Chicago Analysis After Kodak: Interview with Pro-
fessor Steven C. Salop, 7 ANTITRUST, Fall 1992, at 20, 22. Professor Salop viewed the case
as one in which "Kodak exploited customers that had relied on the expectation, based on
their historical experience, that the service market would be competitive." This suggests
that without Kodak's policy change there would have been no need for a trial and seems to
overstate the role of the policy change in the Court's analysis.
138. Id. at 2098 (quoting Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228,
236 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847 (1989)).
139. EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS 104 (1991) (quoting Reder,
Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change, J. ECON. LIr. 13, 21 (1982)).
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for market failure and consumer exploitation was not viewed by Justice
Scalia as simply wrong, it was written off as not the sort of thing about
which the antitrust laws are concerned.
In short, Justice Scalia's dissent is based entirely on the assertion that
markets (for parts) which are derived from competitive markets (for
equipment) must themselves be competitive, because economic theory
tells us this is so. The economic theory is undoubtedly valid, given the
underlying assumptions, such as fully informed buyers, on which it is
based. It is perfectly appropriate to assume facts, as economists conven-
tionally do, for purposes of theoretical analysis, and to formulate theory
based upon such assumptions. It does not follow, however, that the as-
sumptions should be taken as true in a legal controversy implicating the
theory. While the Court in Kodak should not have been concerned with
whether a specific buyer acted on full information, the Court was prop-
erly concerned with whether buyers generally had adequate information
for lifecycle pricing. If most buyers did not have such information, it
seems silly to rely on an economic theory that assumes most did.
Justice Scalia's rigid adherence to economic theory may have been in-
duced by a misunderstanding of the Court's holding. He apparently be-
lieved (having stated it at least twice) that under the majority opinion any
manufacturer of a product requiring unique parts available only from the
manufacturer, automatically possesses market power in the parts mar-
ket.140 This, of course, is not what the Court held. If it were, use of parts
as a tying product would have automatically triggered the per se rule, and
a violation could have been found without a trial. But, far from adopting
this approach, the majority remanded the case for trial stating:
In the end, of course, Kodak's arguments may prove to be correct. It
maybe that . . . the equipment market does discipline the
aftermarkets so that all three are priced competitively overall, or that
any anti-competitive effects of Kodak's behavior are outweighed by
its competitive effects. But we cannot reach these conclusions as a
matter of law on a record this sparse.''
Contrary to Justice Scalia's assertion, the majority eschewed presump-
tions based either on rules of law or economic theory, and insisted upon
an examination of the actual facts. Indeed, it was Justice Scalia who
would have closed the door to evidence and, based on economic theory,
would have presumed that Kodak lacked power in the parts market be-
140.
By alleging a tie of parts to service, rather than of equipment to parts-and-
service, [the plaintiffs] identified a tying product in which Kodak unquestion-
ably held a near-monopoly share: the parts uniquely associated with Kodak's
brand of machines. The Court today holds that such a facial showing of mar-
ket share in a single-brand aftermarket is sufficient to invoke the per se rule.
Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted, emphasis in the origi-
nal). Similarly, later in his dissent Justice Scalia stated: "The Court insists that the record
in this case suggests ... that a tie between parts and service somehow does enable Kodak
to increase overall monopoly profits." Id. at 2099 n.3 (emphasis in the original).
141. Id. at 2092.
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cause it lacked power in the equipment market. As in Brooke, the dis-
pute between the majority and the dissent came down to whether it
should be conclusively presumed that markets perform according to eco-
nomic theory.
Under the majority's view, lifecycle pricing is the critical issue. If the
evidence shows that it does not occur, competition in the equipment mar-
ket would probably not restrain Kodak's ability to raise prices in the parts
market. 142 Kodak would then be able to force consumers to do some-
thing they would not do in a competitive market, that is, to pay a
supracompetitive price for parts. Kodak, therefore, would have market
power.143 So long as it exercised this power by raising the price of parts,
no antitrust violation would occur. Even a monopolist has no duty to
charge a reasonable price. 144 The use of market power in parts, however,
to force a consumer to purchase services he would not purchase in a
competitive market, that is, to purchase Kodak services rather than ISO
services, is the crux of a tying violation.
E. AsSESSING MARKET POWER IN AFTERMARKETS
The notion that information deficiencies (or other market imperfec-
tions) may create some market power in an aftermarket for parts despite
142. Lifecycle pricing should not necessarily be determinative, but it seems by far the
most important issue. Without lifecycle pricing, it is possible that Kodak would have no
power in the parts market if other companies could produce them. Even with lifecycle
pricing, Kodak could have market power in parts if customers are locked in by heavy
switching costs, and the volume of new equipment sales is so low that the loss of equipment
sales is unimportant or if Kodak can discriminate between old (i.e., locked in) and new
customers. These possibilities seem remote and tangential to the central question of life-
cycle pricing. It has been argued that lifecycle pricing is not important to consumer wel-
fare, and therefore, should not be important to antitrust analysis. Sellers able to reap
monopoly profits in the parts market in the absence of lifecycle pricing have a powerful
incentive to set low prices for equipment even though lifecyle pricing does not force them
to do so because low equipment prices mean greater equipment sales which in turn mean
greater parts sales. In order to maximize monopoly profits on parts, sellers will hold down
the price of equipment. So, to the extent the consumer pays more for parts he automati-
cally pays less for equipment. Or, as put by the authors, monopoly profits earned on parts
are "rebated" to consumers through discounting the price of equipment. See Severin Bor-
enstein et al., Antitrust Policy in Aftermarkets, 63 ANrrrRusT L.J. 455, 494 (1995).
This sounds wonderful. It means power in the aftermarket is automatically neutralized
by a reaction in the foremarket, and therefore not a proper antitrust concern; at least if the
exclusive goal of antitrust is maximizing consumer welfare. It's a variation on the con-
sumer welfare argument described above that is frequently made against the antitrust law
of tying. See supra text accompanying note 113. Just as consumers will never pay more for
a package of tied products then the sum of what they would pay for the products sold
individually, so the total amount paid for equipment and parts will be the same with or
without lifecycle pricing. To the extent lifecycle pricing holds down the price of parts, it
holds up the price of equipment. Without lifecycle pricing, the price of parts might go up
but inevitably the price of equipment will decline. So there is no reason to worry about
lifecycle pricing. While this is an interesting theory, standing alone it is not relevant to
proper judicial decisionmaking. The defendant would have to back it up with evidence,
and Kodak didn't. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
143. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2080 (quoting Hyde, 466 U.S. at 14).
144. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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competition in the primary market for equipment, raises the question of
how the significance of market power in the aftermarket should be as-
sessed. The Court did not address this issue, and while Justice Scalia rec-
ognized the possibility of such power,145 he simply concluded without
analysis that it was trivial and not worthy of concern under the antitrust
laws.' 46
Imperfections exist in most, if not all, markets. If one has unlimited
faith in price theory, as Justice Scalia apparently does, market imperfec-
tions are never a concern. However, as Professor Hovenkamp has recog-
nized, 147 a central problem of antitrust is determining when imperfections
create market power of a degree warranting concern. He assessed the
degree of market power in aftermarkets using a method of analysis simi-
lar to that employed under the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Merger Guidelines). 48
Observing that "the Kodak decision was probably correct in its bare hold-
ing,"149 Professor Hovenkamp concluded that in most cases market
power in the aftermarket will not be significant.' 50 While his method is
sound, Professor Hovenkamp's conclusion seems questionable.
A threshold question in determining the legality of a merger is whether
the acquiring and acquired firms compete, and, if so, what portion of the
market will be controlled by the merged firms. The answer to both ques-
tions depends upon market definition. If products produced by the two
firms are close substitutes, consumers can readily switch from one to the
other, and the firms will be viewed as competitors. Similarly, if there is a
range of close substitutes produced by other firms, all such products will
be included in the relevant market. This will then drive down the portion
of the market controlled by the merged firms.
The critical question in determining a relevant product market is: How
should we determine whether product A is a sufficiently close substitute
for product B so that both products should be placed in the same market?
The Merger Guidelines employ the economic concept of cross-elasticity
of demand to answer this question. In general, they provide that if a sin-
gle firm controlling all sales of product A could profitably impose a
"small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price, then products
A and B will not be in the same market. On the other hand, if such an
increase would cause customers to switch to product B in sufficient num-
bers to reduce the profitability of product A, then products A and B
would be placed in the same market since competition between them
serves to restrain price increases.' 5 '
145. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
146. Id.
147. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the
Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1447 (1993).
148. 57 Fed. Reg. 41552.
149. Id. at 1454.
150. Id. at 1459.
151. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 122, § 1.11.
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In applying this concept to the measurement of power in an
aftermarket Professor Hovenkamp provided the following example:
Suppose that a photocopier costs $3000 and has a life expectancy of
five years. Thus, disregarding the time value of money, the cost of
the photocopier is $600 per year. In addition, suppose that the cop-
ier has a one-year unlimited warranty. Thereafter, providing repair
parts costs $100 per year. Suppose further that through the use of
tying arrangements, or similar practices by which the manufacturer
restricts subsequent service, the manufacturer is able to increase the
price of repair services to $125 per year-a 25% 'monopoly' price
increase, which appears to be a sign of substantial monopoly power
in the aftermarket.
But note further that this $25 yearly increase for four years adds
only $100 to the total cost of owning a photocopier. At the competi-
tive price, ownership of the photocopier over its five-year lifetime
costs $3400. At the 'monopoly' price for replacement parts, owner-
ship costs $3500, which is a little less than a 3% price increase above
the competitive level.152
Consistently with the Merger Guidelines, Professor Hovenkamp sug-
gests that a three percent overcharge would not reflect sufficient market
power to raise antitrust concerns. In general, the Merger Guidelines treat
as significant a price increase of five percent or more lasting for the fore-
seeable future. 153 Of course, as Professor Hovenkamp recognizes, if the
price increase is viewed as a twenty-five percent increase, the price re-
flects a degree of market power with which the antitrust laws should be
concerned and which would satisfy the market power requirement for a
per se violation on a tying theory.
The difficult question is whether the twenty-five dollar monopoly profit
realized each year on the sale of parts should be viewed as a monopoly
return of three percent on the sale of equipment and parts, or as a mo-
nopoly return of twenty-five percent on the sale of parts. Professor
Hovenkamp concludes it should be the former so long as
the only function of the aftermarket product or service is to support
the same manufacturer's primary product. For example, Chrysler
may develop a superior transmission that makes its automobiles
more desirable and permits Chrysler to raise its price well above its
costs. But in that case we would speak of the market power as being
in the automobile, not in the transmission. 54
Professor Hovenkamp is clearly correct with respect to the Chrysler
transmission. A consumer deciding to purchase a Chrysler automobile
for $20,000 which reflects a 25% monopoly return on the transmission is
paying a single price for a package which includes all the component
parts of the automobile. A purchaser of a photocopier would be in an
analogous position if the photocopier were sold with a 5-year unlimited
152. Hovenvamp, supra note 147, at 1456.
153. 1992 Horizontal Guidelines, supra note 122, § 1.11.
154. Hovencamp, supra note 147, at 1457 (emphasis in original).
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warranty for $3,500, reflecting a 25% monopoly return on the parts and
service. The photocopier purchaser could then compare the $3,500 price,
to the price of similar equipment, parts and service available from others;
just as the purchaser of a Chrysler with its unique transmission could
compare the $20,000 price for the Chrysler to the price of a Ford with a
less attractive transmission.
The main point of the majority opinion was that lifecycle pricing might
not occur, and the parts market would then function independently of the
equipment market. If the parts market is independent of (or competi-
tively distinct from) the equipment market, it is not apparent why a mo-
nopoly return on parts should be viewed as inconsequential simply
because it is small in relation to the cost of equipment. Such an approach
makes lifecycle pricing irrelevant. Sales in a competitively distinct parts
market are viewed as competitively related to sales in the equipment
market when in fact no such relationship exists.155
Looking at the analogy from another perspective, it would be more
compelling if the Chrysler was sold with no transmission and with no in-
formation available to customers concerning the price of the transmis-
sion. Once a customer owned the transmissionless car, Chrysler would
have power in pricing the transmission that would be similar to that pos-
sessed by Kodak in pricing its parts, if lack of information precluded life-
cycle pricing by Kodak customers. Of course, in the context of the
automobile market this is absurd. It is likely that prospective purchasers
could accurately predict that they would need one transmission for the
life of the car, and would insist on complete price information concerning
the transmission before buying the car. In short, lifecycle pricing would
occur and competition in the automobile market would limit Chrysler's
ability to price the transmission. Perhaps similar conditions exist in the
photocopier market. Perhaps they do not. Absent a trial, its difficult to
know.' 56
In the end, Professor Hovenkamp appears to agree with Justice Scalia
that market power in the aftermarket is not much of an antitrust problem
because generally firms will have only "the ability to exploit small
amounts of market power."'1 57 Of course, the reason that the amount of
market power is small is that the supracompetitive price for parts is re-
lated to the total price of equipment plus parts, even if competition in the
155. This is analogous to Justice Scalia's error in treating a tie of parts to service as
equivalent to a tie of parts to equipment. See supra text following note 135.
156. To carry the hypothetical one step further, if Chrysler sold cars without transmis-
sions and then tied the sale of installation services to the sale of transmissions, competition
in the car market would restrain power over price in the transmission market. It would be
appropriate for a court to take judicial notice of the fact that every purchaser of a car
knows that the car will need a transmission and would not buy the car without knowing the
cost of the transmission and installation services. But it would not be appropriate for a
court to take judicial notice of the fact that every purchaser of a photocopier knows what
parts it will require over its lifetime, and the cost of those parts. Nor should a court engage
in a presumption having the same practical effect.
157. Hovenkamp, supra note 147, at 1458.
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equipment market does not effectively limit the pricing of parts; and,
therefore, as defined by cross-elasticity of demand, the markets are
separate.
An unstated assumption of the Scalia/Hovenkamp approach seems to
be that manufacturers have an inherent right to exploit an installed base.
It is, after all, the sale of Kodak equipment that creates the market for
Kodak parts and service. If Kodak concludes that it can maximize its
profits through competitive pricing of equipment followed by supracom-
petitive pricing of parts and service implemented through a tying arrange-
ment, it is within its rights in doing so.
The Supreme Court took a similar view in A.B. Dick,158 upholding the
right of a manufacturer of a stencil-duplicating machine to require pur-
chasers of the machine to use only paper, ink and other supplies made by
the manufacturer. There the Court stated:
The market for the sale of such articles to the users of his machine
... was a market which he alone created by the making and selling of
a new invention. Had he kept his invention to himself, no ink could
have been sold by others for use upon machines embodying that in-
vention. By selling it subject to the restriction he took nothing from
others and in no wise restricted their legitimate market.'5 9
Similarly, under the Scalia/Hovenkamp approach, an ISO could never
have a legitimate complaint against Kodak as a result of being fenced out
of the Kodak service market, so long as Kodak sold its equipment in a
competitive market.' 60 Like the A.B. Dick Court, the Scalia/Hovenkamp
approach seems to assume a manufacturer has a possessory interest in
aftermarkets created by its products. Since the aftermarkets belong to
the manufacturer, no legitimate harm can arise out of a tie which merely
protects the aftermarkets against infringement by others. The rationale is
less sweeping than that of A.B. Dick because it applies only if the equip-
ment is sold in a competitive market. But the practical result is similar in
those cases to which the rationale applies. Congress rejected the A.B.
Dick case when it adopted section 3 of the Clayton Act, without regard to
whether the supracompetitive profit on the sale of ink was small com-
pared with the price of the machine. It was then overruled in Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. 161 There is no sound rea-
son it ought to be resurrected. If competition in the primary market does
not limit power over price in the aftermarket, the two markets should not
be treated as one in assessing market power in the aftermarket.
158. 224 U.S. at 1 (1912).
159. Id. at 32.
160. Theoretically, an ISO is only precluded from relying on the per se rule and could
still press a claim under the rule of reason. However, once the market power issue has
been resolved against the claimant as a matter of law there would be no realistic possibility
of succeeding on a rule of reason claim.
161. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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IV. BROOKE AND KODAK COMPARED AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
In one sense, Brooke and Kodak seem to point in opposite directions.
In Brooke the plaintiff failed because the Court viewed its theory of com-
petitive injury as economically implausible. Economic theory tells us a
nondominant firm pricing below cost is unlikely to recover its losses
through oligopolistic pricing. Therefore, any claim based on the proposi-
tion that a nondominant firm pricing below cost had a reasonable pros-
pect of recouping its losses through oligopolistic pricing must fail,
regardless of the facts. That was clearly the holding of the court of ap-
peals in Brooke, and it was the practical effect of the holding of the
Supreme Court. Kodak, on the other hand, viewed economic theory as
having a far more limited role in the resolution of antitrust issues. Even
though a claim may be economically questionable, the plaintiff might be
entitled to its day in court depending on the factual issues raised by the
complaint. Thus, while economic theory tells us an aftermarket will be
competitive if the primary market is competitive, a plaintiff may offer
evidence that in its particular case this is not so. The plaintiff's burden
may be heavy in light of what economic theory suggests, but it will not be
shut out of court on the basis of theory alone. In short, under Brooke
economic theory can trump facts. Under Kodak, the opposite is true.
The reach of Brooke may be more limited than its result suggests. The
Supreme Court and the court of appeals were in agreement as to the
result, and the Supreme Court's analysis seems to have foreclosed recov-
ery on a predatory pricing theory outside the monopoly setting, just as
did the court of appeals. It can be argued, therefore, that the Supreme
Court shared with the court of appeals a willingness to allow economic
theory to foreclose factual analysis in antitrust cases. For reasons dis-
cussed above,162 the argument seems persuasive so far as predatory pric-
ing is concerned. But, it would be a mistake to assume that Brooke
reflects an inclination on the part of the Supreme Court generally to ac-
cord economic theory the dominant role it held there.
In distinguishing its approach from that of the court of appeals, the
Supreme Court stated that
[a] predatory pricing scheme designed to preserve or create a stable
oligopoly, if successful, can injure consumers in the same way, and to
the same extent, as one designed to bring about a monopoly. How-
ever unlikely that possibility may be as a general matter, when the
realities of the market and the record facts indicate that it has oc-
curred and was likely to have succeeded, theory will not stand in the
way of liability.163
Thus, the court of appeals' notion that recoupment through oligopolistic
pricing cannot occur as a matter of law because it is economically implau-
sible was specifically rejected. While it is difficult to conceive of a preda-
162. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
163. Brooke, 113 S. Ct. at 2591.
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tory pricing scheme outside the monopoly setting that could be
successfully challenged under the Supreme Court's opinion, this results
from the Court's belief that predatory pricing is seldom successful and
hardly ever occurs. Outside the predatory pricing area, as Kodak so
clearly demonstrates, economic theory is far less likely to dominate the
Court's analysis. 164
The Court's over reliance on economic theory in Brooke is reminiscent
of its merger analysis in the 1960s. There too economic theory played a
dominant role. Theories of industrial organization economics, especially
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, 165 were relied upon to de-
termine the probable competitive effect of mergers. Market structure
(mainly, but not exclusively, the number of firms in the market and their
respective market shares), was viewed as influencing firm conduct (espe-
cially pricing practices and methods of competition), and thus determin-
ing how effectively firms perform in meeting the needs of consumers. In
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank' 66 the Court relied on this
theory in adopting a rule of presumptive illegality for any merger produc-
ing a firm with an undue percentage share of the market and creating a
significant increase in concentration.1 67 A thirty percent market share
was held to be "undue," and an increase in the share of the market con-
trolled by the two largest firms from forty-four to sixty percent was held
to be "significant.' 168 Under this presumptive rule, the merger was held
unlawful. 169
Subsequently, in United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,' 70 the Court com-
bined the rule of Philadelphia National Bank with the incipiency doctrine
of the Clayton Act,171 to hold unlawful a merger of two grocery retail
firms with a combined market share of 7.5 percent. The Court found sig-
nificant a trend toward concentration shown by a decrease in the number
of single-store grocery firms from 5,365 to 3,818. Despite evidence of
intense competition in a dynamic market both before and after the
merger, the Court allowed the structure-conduct-performance paradigm
164. For another view concerning why Brooke "should not quickly be read to change
traditional deference to jury verdicts," see Calkins, supra note 91, at 393. Professor Cal-
kins argues that Brooke was unique because the jury instructions were flawed and the
verdict "deserved (and received) no deference." Id. While he is correct about the jury
instructions, as Professor Calkins recognized, id at 382, the Court did not once refer to the
inadequacy of the instructions. It is likely, therefore, that the Court would have taken the
same approach and reached the same result even if the instructions had been flawless.
165. For a description of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm see supra note 5
and accompanying text.
166. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
167. Id. at 363.
168. Id. at 364-65.
169. Id at 371.
170. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
171. Concerning the incipiency doctrine under § 7 of the Clayton Act, the Court stated:
"[Section] 7 requires not merely an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger upon
competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive conditions in the future; this is
what is meant when it is said that the amended § 7 was intended to arrest anticompetitive
tendencies in their 'incipiency.'" Id. at 278.
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derived from industrial organization economics to govern the outcome of
the case.172 Dissenting, Justice Stewart commented that the sole consis-
tency in the Court's merger cases was that "the Government always
wins." 173
In both Von's and Brooke the Court closed its eyes to record evidence
and allowed economic theory to govern the determination of probable
competitive effect. Von's condemned all but the most insignificant hori-
zontal merger. Brooke removes from the category of predatory conduct,
below cost pricing outside the monopoly setting. The Von's Court relied
on economic theory rooted in the 1930s. Depression inspired skepticism
of the classical economic view that free markets guided only by Adam
Smith's invisible hand achieve optimal performance 174 gave rise to the
notion that poor performance can be identified with particular structural
characteristics such as undue concentration. 175 Structural defects call for
curative action, and that is what the Court of the 1960s sought to provide.
Brooke reflects renewed faith in classical free market economics-a be-
lief that government intervention whether in the form of antitrust or
otherwise, adversely affects market performance, and should be mini-
mized. Pushed to its extreme, free market theory obviates the need for
antitrust. Even explicit price fixing is not a serious concern because car-
tels are inherently unstable and eventually break down. 176
Unfortunately, such sweeping generalizations tend to conceal truth,
rather than reveal it. And it makes little difference whether the general-
izations reflect classical price theory or industrial organization economics.
172. Id at 278.
173. Id. at 301. Although Von's has not been overruled, it has been severely undercut
by subsequent decisions that have reduced the evidentiary burden on the defendant in
rebutting the presumption of anticompetitive effect based on market share. See, e.g.,
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974); United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981,
990 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("Although the Supreme Court has not overruled these section 7
precedents [Philadelphia Nat'l Bank and Von's], it has cut them back sharply." Id.); Hospi-
tal Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038
(1987).
174. In 1776, Adam Smith made the case for a free market system in which individuals
were allowed freely to pursue their own interests. Under such conditions, Smith argued,
the individual
neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is
promoting it. . ., he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of
his intentions.... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that
of the society more effectually then when he really intends to promote it. I
have never known much good to be done by those who affected to trade for
the public good.
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIoNs, 477-78 (E. Cannon ed., 1976) (first published in 1776, now in two volumes).
175. For a brief description of the competing theories of structuralism and classical eco-
nomics, see E. SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCE-
DURE, 70-72 (3d ed. 1994); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 42-47.
176. See Posner, supra note 24, at 932. Few, if any, would now subscribe to this extreme
view. However, Chicago School economists would assign antitrust the very limited role of
preventing explicit price fixing and mergers between competitors with very large market
shares. Id at 933.
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Between Von's and Brooke, the economic theory favored by the Court
has changed, but the process is not new and the outcome is equally pre-
dictable. The Brooke holding suggests that the legality of pricing below
cost outside the monopoly setting, like the legality of horizontal mergers
during the 1960s, will be resolved on the basis of abstract economic gen-
eralizations. However, dicta in the Brooke opinion, and the holding of
the Kodak case indicate that in other areas of antitrust, issues will con-
tinue or be resolved on a case-by-case basis with factual analysis facili-
tated, not supplanted, by economic theory.
On the other hand, neither Brooke nor Kodak was decided by a unani-
mous Court, and the Court is not a static institution. The Scalia dissent in
Kodak (joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas), like the court of ap-
peals opinion in Brooke and the Supreme Court decision in Von's, re-
flects a doctrinal approach to economic theory. Since economic theory
tells us an aftermarket generally will be competitive if the primary market
is competitive, the dissent would presume as a matter of law that the
aftermarket is competitive, if the evidence shows (or, as in Kodak, the
parties stipulate) that the primary market is competitive.
Justice White, who was with the majority in Kodak, now has been re-
placed by Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Blackmun, who wrote the major-
ity opinion in Kodak, has been replaced by Justice Breyer. If Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg adopt the Scalia approach to the use of economic
theory in antitrust analysis, a majority of the Court (i.e., Justices Scalia,
O'Connor, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer) would be inclined to empha-
size pervasively economic theory over factual analysis in antitrust
cases. 177 The likely result would be that just as the Court's overreliance
on industrial organization economics caused Justice Stewart to accurately
state that the only consistent theme running through the merger decisions
of the 1960s was that "the Government always wins,"'178 overreliance on
classical economics would mean that the only consistent theme of future
antitrust litigation would be that the defendant always wins.
Nothing in Justice Ginsburg's record from her years on the Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit or from her first two terms on the Supreme
Court suggests her approach to the use of economic theory in antitrust
analysis. 179 Judge Breyer has written a number of antitrust opinions for
the First Circuit Court of Appeals.180 None seems to have involved a
177. Considering Kodak and Brooke together, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas
were consistent in their reliance on economic theory (i.e., dissenting in Kodak and with the
majority in Brooke); Justices Blackmun, White, and Stevens were consistent in their reli-
ance on factual analysis (i.e., with the majority in Kodak and dissenting in Brooke); Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Souter were with the majority in both Kodak
and Brooke, reflecting a willingness to selectively (perhaps in predatory pricing cases) em-
phasize economic theory over factual analysis.
178. See supra text accompanying note 173.
179. See Calkins, supra note 91, at 405 ("Justice Ginsburg's antitrust views must be
considered mixed and not yet fully developed." Id.)
180. See, e.g., Monahan's Marine, Inc. v. Boston Whaler, Inc., 866 F.2d 525 (1st Cir.
1989); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988); Clamp-
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clear triumph of theory over facts of the type involved in Brooke or Jus-
tice Scalia's Kodak dissent; however, some do exhibit a tendency toward
overreliance on economic theory.
For example, in Grapponel8' a car dealer claimed that its supplier vio-
lated the antitrust laws by requiring the dealer to purchase a specified
number of replacement parts. The dealer relied on a tying theory, and, as
in Kodak, the critical issue was whether the supplier had power in the
market for the tying product (i.e., cars). Reversing a district court deci-
sion in favor of the dealer, Judge Breyer held that, in light of Subaru's
small market share, the defendant could not possess such power. 182 In
reaching this conclusion, he reasoned that:
One cannot infer an automatic harm to the competitive process sim-
ply because a Seller refuses to sell Product A to a Buyer unless the
Buyer also buys Product B .... If the Seller does not have market
power in respect to product A, it cannot force buyers to take a more
expensive or less desirable Product B, for if the Seller tries to do so,
buyers will simply turn elsewhere for Product A.183
As Kodak teaches, while Judge Breyer may have been entirely correct
as a matter of abstract economic reasoning, the issue should be whether
the reasoning holds true under the specific circumstances of the case. In
other words, under the specific facts of this case could buyers "simply
turn elsewhere," or did the seller have some special ability to force buyers
to do something they would not do in a competitive market? 84 It is en-
tirely possible that the costs to dealers of switching from one line of cars
to another created power in the supplier to force the dealers to purchase
unwanted or overpriced replacement parts. This would have been espe-
cially likely if the supplier had an established dealer system and was not
seeking new dealers in competition with other car suppliers. If such
power existed despite Subaru's small market share, competition in the car
market probably would not be an effective restraint on the pricing of re-
placement parts. It was exactly this type of factual inquiry that the Court
demanded in Kodak.
After noting that no evidence was offered to establish that dealer
switching costs created economic power in the supplier, Judge Breyer
concluded that even if such power did exist, it "could [not] easily translate
into Subaru market power of a kind that, though tying, could ultimately
lead to higher than competitive prices for consumers."1 85 No explanation
was provided as to why overpriced parts would not impact prices to con-
All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1007 (1989); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983).
181. 858 F.2d at 792.
182. Id. at 797.
183. Id. at 795.
184. In Hyde the Court stated: "[W]e have condemned tying arrangements when the
seller has some special ability-usually called 'market power'-to force a purchaser to do
something that he would not do in a competitive market." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984).
185. Grappone, 858 F.2d at 798.
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sumers. This is not to say the case was wrongly decided, but only that it
could not be decided properly on the basis of economic theory alone. In
general, Breyer's reasoning reflects the same defect as Scalia's Kodak dis-
sent. Subaru had only one percent of the U.S. car market. 186 Economic
theory tells us that sellers with tiny market shares do not usually have
market power, and tying arrangements without market power are harm-
less. Therefore, Subaru's tie must have been harmless.
V. CONCLUSION
Antitrust decisions from the 1960s that have been most widely discred-
ited, such as Schwinn and Von's, were the product of a Court that failed
to keep economic analysis in proper perspective. Economic theory was
either ignored (Schwinn), or allowed to displace careful factual analysis
(Von's). A cohesive minority comprised of Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
and Thomas would repeat the mistake of an earlier era. In contrast to
that period, the effect today would be to narrow rather than expand the
role of antitrust. The result, however, would be equally unfortunate and
undoubtedly also short-lived. If antitrust law is to achieve a degree of
stability and be enforced in a reasoned and consistent manner, then, as in
other areas of law, statutory language, congressional intent, judicial pre-
cedent, and factual analysis must be the dominant factors of antitrust de-
cision making. Economic theory has an important role in bringing these
factors to bear in the resolution of specific issues, but it should not be
permitted to displace them.
186. Id at 797.
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